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What are the earnings and employment losses that workers suffer when demand for their occupations 
declines? To answer this question we combine forecasts on occupational employment changes, which 
allow us to identify unanticipated declines; administrative data on the population of Swedish workers, 
spanning several decades; and a highly detailed occupational classification. We find that, compared to 
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considerably larger losses. These earnings losses are partly accounted for by reduced employment, and 
increased unemployment and retraining. 
 
 
Key words: technological change, occupations, inequality 
JEL Codes: O33; J24; J62 
 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Labour Markets Programme.  The Centre for Economic 
Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
 
 
We thank Wenkui Liu for excellent research assistance. We are indebted to Michael Böhm, Adrian 
Adermon, Magnus Gustavsson, and Linus Liljeberg for sharing code and data. For helpful comments and 
discussions, we thank our discussants Jonathan Haskell and Robert Seamans, as well as Daron Acemoglu, 
David Autor, Abhijit Banerjee, Paul Beaudry, Matias Cortes, Nicole Fortin, Peter Fredriksson, Thomas 
Lemieux, Marco Manacorda, Alan Manning, Mattias Nordin, Barbara Petrongolo, Steve Pischke, Oskar 
Nordström Skans, Assaf Peretz, Jonathan Vogel, and Alwyn Young; participants at AEA meetings in 
Philadelphia and Atlanta, CEP Policy Roundtable, CEPR/ECB Conference, ECB Heads of Research 
workshop, Employment in Europe conference in Cyprus, ENEF conference in Sussex, EssexWorkshop on 
Innovation and Labor Markets, Nordic Summer Institute in Labour Economics, Queen Mary Economic 
Workshop, Royal Society and British Academy workshop, and TU Munich workshop on Innovation, 
Technological Change, and International Trade; and seminar participants at IIES, IFN, Konstanz, Linnaeus 
University, LSE, Mannheim, MIT, Sveriges Riksbank, UBC, Uppsala University, and the World Bank. We 
are grateful to the Centre for Economic Performance and to Forte: Swedish Research Council for Health, 
Working Life and Welfare for generous financial support. Graetz thanks the faculty and staff of ifo 
Institute Munich, where part of the work on this paper was done, for their hospitality. Any opinions and 
errors are our own. 
 Per-Anders Edin, Uppsala University. Tiernan Evans Centre for Economic Performance, London 
School of Economics. Georg Graetz, Uppsala University and Centre for Economic Performance, London 
School of Economics. Sofia Hernnäs, Uppsala University. Guy Michaels, London School of Economics 
and Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. 
 
 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor be 
issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published. 
 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the editor 
at the above address. 
 
 
 P-A. Enders, T. Evans, G. Graetz, S. Hernnäs and G. Michaels, submitted 2019. 
1 Introduction
What are the long-run employment and earnings losses incurred by individual workers when
demand for their occupation declines? This question lies at the heart of policy debates on
responses to technologies that replace workers (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2019), and is relevant
for broader discussions on labor market transformations due to technological change (see for
instance Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014, Autor, 2015, and Caselli and Manning, 2018). New
labor-replacing technologies no longer threaten only machine operatives and clerical workers.
Self-driving vehicles may reduce the employment of drivers (Campbell, 2018), and artificial
intelligence software challenges professionals such as lawyers and financial investors (Susskind
and Susskind, 2015) and even fashion designers (Scheiber, 2018). This is causing considerable
angst. It is therefore important to understand how costly occupation-replacing technologies are
for workers, since this informs our thinking about individual welfare, inequality, and human
capital investments. It is also important for public policy decisions on taxation, redistribution,
retirement, and education, and may even have broader political consequences (Marx, 1867;
Caprettini and Voth, 2017; Dal Bo, Finan, Folke, Persson, and Rickne, 2019).
In this paper, we investigate the consequences of large, negative occupational demand changes
for individual workers’ careers. We combine forecasts on occupational employment changes,
which allow us to identify unanticipated declines; population-level administrative data spanning
several decades; and a highly detailed occupational classification. We are therefore able to study
similar workers who perform similar tasks and have similar expectations of future occupational
employment trajectories, but experience different actual employment changes.1
To measure occupational decline, we use the US Occupational Outlook Handbook (Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 1986, henceforth OOH), which allows us to identify which occupations
declined in the US since the mid-1980s; to check whether occupational declines had likely
technology drivers; and to gauge expectations of employment growth at the time. For reasons
that we discuss below, our baseline definition of occupational decline requires that employment
contracted by at least 25 percent since the mid-1980, though we also explore many alternative
1For example, the employment of typists has nearly vanished, while secretaries’ employment has grown.
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definitions. We match the occupational information from the OOH to individual-level panel
data on the entire Swedish population. Thus, we utilize the best aspects of both countries’
data: the US data allow us to study occupational changes over time and separate unanticipated
changes from anticipated ones, while the Swedish data let us follow individuals who differ in
their exposure to occupational declines, but were otherwise very similar.
Focusing on cohorts that were in prime working age from the mid-1980s till the mid-2010s,
we study how cumulative long-run outcomes (such as earnings and employment) differ for those
who in 1985 worked in occupations that subsequently declined. We control for the initial sorting
of workers into declining occupations by gender, age, education, income, and location in 1985.
We show that conditional on these controls, those in occupations that subsequently declined
had similar cognitive and non-cognitive skills and parental education and earnings, and similar
pre-1985 earnings, as other workers. In some specifications we add other controls, includ-
ing measures of occupation-varying life-cycle profiles and predictors of occupational change,
which allow us to isolate unanticipated occupational declines, and we also control for broad
occupation and industry dummies. We provide evidence that our various specifications yield
credible bounds on the impact of occupational decline.
We also confirm that both our OOH-based measure of occupational decline and the pre-
dicted changes in US employment correlate strongly with the employment changes in Swe-
den. Specifically, Swedish workers who started out in occupations that subsequently declined
were exposed to employment growth that was 20-40 log points lower than in non-declining
occupations. We find that compared to workers with similar characteristics, those exposed to
occupational decline lost about 5 percent of mean cumulative pre-tax earnings and 2 percent
of mean cumulative employment. And compared to similar workers in similar occupations
and industries, the cumulative earnings losses were only around 2 percent, and the cumulative
employment losses were around 1 percent. We also find that those in declining occupations
were significantly more likely to have exited their 1985 occupation by 2013. If occupational
demand curves slope downward, this higher exit likely mitigated the earnings losses for those
who remained in declining occupations.
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While mean earnings losses from occupational decline were around 2-5 percent, those in
the bottom tercile of their occupation’s earnings distribution in 1985 suffered larger losses,
amounting to 8-11 percent. Those at the bottom (and possibly also the top) of their occupation’s
earnings distribution were also less likely to remain in their starting occupation.
We also find that occupational decline increased the cumulative time spent in unemployment
(accounting for roughly a third of lost employment) and retraining (accounting for just under ten
percent of lost employment). Moreover, occupational decline led to slightly earlier retirement
among middle-aged (in 1985) workers.
In addition, we show that our main findings are largely unchanged when we restrict the
analysis to occupational declines that are explicitly linked to specific technological changes, as
documented in the OOH.
Finally, we estimate mean earnings and employment losses from occupational decline that
were similar in magnitude or possibly even smaller using micro data from the US (National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979); the NLSY estimates (at least for earnings) are, however,
noisier than those using Swedish data. Nevertheless, these findings suggest that our estimates
of losses from occupational decline may generalize to settings beyond Sweden.
To frame our empirical analysis of the consequences of occupational decline, we construct
a Roy (1951) model with occupational demand shocks. As discussed above, we find that the
largest earnings losses from occupational decline in Sweden are incurred by those who earned
the least within their initial occupations. This finding is inconsistent with the frictionless Roy
model, but it is consistent with a version where occupational switching costs decline in the
workers’ ability in the destination occupation. Moreover, our empirical analysis sheds light on
the nature of the occupational switching costs, as almost half of the employment losses we esti-
mate are accounted for by a combination of increased retraining and especially unemployment.
Our model can account for additional empirical findings when we also allow for worker
displacement. In this case, those with lower initial within-occupation earnings rank suffer larger
earnings losses as a result of occupational decline; switchers’ earnings losses may be larger than
those of stayers; and switching probabilities are U-shaped in initial earnings, whereby low-
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earning workers switch occupations if displaced, while high-earning workers switch regardless
of displacement when faced with occupational decline.
Occupational decline is a salient feature of the evolution of labor markets (Goldin, 2000).
But despite its importance, we know relatively little about its consequences of occupational
decline for individuals’ careers. While there is a large literature on the costs of occupational
mobility, we are not aware of previous estimates of workers’ earnings losses from negative
occupation-level demand changes.2
Our paper is distinct from panel studies of workers who differ in the routineness of their
jobs.3 A key difference is that we can compare similar workers, even doing similar work, with
different exposure to occupational decline.4 Our paper also differs conceptually from studies of
mass layoffs. Occupational decline can sometimes be managed through retirement and reduced
hiring, allowing workers to change jobs without leaving employment; and occupational decline
need not entail severe spillovers for local labor markets, unlike mass layoffs (Gathmann, Helm,
and Scho¨nberg, 2018). While magnitude comparisons across studies should be interpreted with
caution, the mean loss that we find from occupational decline is generally lower than the loss
from mass layoffs.5 Finally, our paper also differs from studies of trade shocks, which affect
import-competing firms and industries, while the changes we study typically affect individual
workers within firms.
Our paper is also related to Dauth, Findeisen, Suedekum, and Woessner (2018), who ex-
plore how workers fare who are exposed to industrial robots; ours differs by exploring the
consequences of a broader set of changes in occupational employment. Furthermore, our paper
2Cortes and Gallipoli (2017), Kambourov and Manovskii (2009), Pavan (2011), and Sullivan (2010) estimate
the human capital losses associated with switching occupations. An older literature, including Neal (1995) and
Parent (2000) studies the cost of moving across industries, while in other related work Gathmann and Scho¨nberg
(2010) and Poletaev and Robinson (2008) focus on task-specific human capital. Changes in the task content of
existing occupations (for instance Spitz-Oener, 2006), while also potentially relevant, are outside the scope of our
study due to data limitations.
3See for example Cortes (2016) and Autor and Dorn (2009).
4Also related is independent work by Schmillen (2018), who studies employment shocks faced by German
apprentices, although our paper differs in its research question, econometric inference, and outcomes.
5Studies of mass layoffs in Sweden find losses of 4-6 percent of annual earnings in the 5-10 years following
displacement (Eliason and Storrie, 2006; OECD, 2015). In the US losses from displacement are generally larger,
and range from 7-14 percent of earnings (Davis and Von Wachter, 2011), or possibly even higher for workers who
were highly attached to their firms (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan, 1993). Galaasen and Kostøl (2018) and Bana
(2019) explore how mass layoffs’ effects differ for occupations facing negative demand shocks, but their focus is
still on mass layoffs
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is related to the literature on possible future displacement due to technological changes. Fore-
casts of occupational displacement range from almost 50 percent (Frey and Osborne, 2017) to
around 10 percent (Arntz, Gregory, and Zierahn, 2017, who obtain a lower estimate by taking
into account within-occupation heterogeneity in tasks). At the same time, Bessen (2016) con-
cludes that technology has, at least so far, not been a net destroyer of jobs. Even if this benign
aggregate trend continues, however, some occupations may be replaced by technology, and our
study offers a way to assess the losses from occupational displacement.
Sweden’s economy and labor market institutions constitute the backdrop to most of our
empirical analysis. During the period of our study, the Swedish economy experienced a deep
recession in the early 1990s and a milder one in 2008 (Lindbeck, 1997; Gottfries, 2018), and
we find that earnings losses in declining occupations were worse during those recessions. Wage
inequality in Sweden increased during the 1980s and 1990s and remained relatively stable there-
after (Skans, Edin, and Holmlund, 2009). Swedish labor market institutions have been charac-
terized by strong labor unions and substantial public spending on labor market policies. Unions
have generally embraced technological changes to promote productivity and wage gains, while
expecting that active labor market policy will help displaced workers find work (Edin and Holm-
lund, 1995). There is, indeed, some evidence that Sweden’s occupational retraining programs
raise earnings (Vikstro¨m and van den Berg, 2017), so they may have contributed to the modest
losses from occupational decline that we find.6 At the same time, our finding of similarly mod-
est mean earnings and employment losses from occupational decline in the US, suggests that
workers find ways to mitigate losses from occupational decline even in other settings.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model, Sections
3 and 4 discuss our data and empirical strategy, respectively, Section 5 presents our results, and
Section 6 concludes.
6Another feature of Swedish labor market institutions are so-called employment security agreements reached
between labor unions and business associations, and administered by works councils. These agreements stipu-
late counselling of laid-off workers to minimize the duration of their unemployment. We do not consider these
agreements important in driving our results because, first, private sector blue-collar workers were only covered
from 2004 onwards, and second, a careful evaluation of these agreements does not find strong support for positive
treatment effects (Andersson, 2017).
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2 Occupational decline in a Roy model
This section presents a simple model to help us frame our empirical investigation. We consider
two occupations, one of which is hit by a negative demand shock. We investigate how workers’
likelihood of leaving the affected occupation, and their earnings losses, depend on their initial
earnings. Starting from a standard frictionless Roy (1951) model, we successively introduce
positive and potentially heterogeneous costs of switching occupation; as well as the possibility
that workers are displaced from their jobs and incur a cost to find a new job even when remaining
in their initial occupation. Finally, we consider how workers’ sorting differs when the negative
demand shock is anticipated in advance. A complete, self-contained exposition of the model is
given in the online appendix. Here we only summarize the main elements.
We consider a competitive economy with a continuum of individuals indexed by i who live
for two periods t ∈ {1,2} and each supplies a unit of labor inelastically each period. There are
two occupations indexed by k ∈ {A,B} for the workers to choose from. Workers’ per-period log
earnings are given by yikt = pikt +αik− cikt , where pikt is the time-varying and stochastic (log)
price of a unit of output in occupation k, αik is the time-invariant (log) amount of output that
worker i produces in occupation k, and cikt ≥ 0 is a time cost related to occupational switching,
which we discuss below.7 There are no saving opportunities and earnings are consumed imme-
diately. We define the life-time expected utility function as ❊[yik1+βyik2], where β > 0 is a
discount factor. In each period, workers choose the occupation that maximizes their expected
utility. As a normalization, we assume that workers always choose occupation A if indifferent.
Since we focus our analysis on relative wages, we define pit ≡ piBt−piAt and assume for simplic-
ity that pi1 = 0.
8 Prices are determined in equilibrium by supply and demand. However, here
we take them as given, and analyze the consequences of a change to prices occurring in period
2 for occupational sorting and earnings. Note that the second period may be interpreted as all
periods following this change, so β could be larger than one. For simplicity, we assume that
7The time cost may reflect search or retraining (or both); we assume throughout that a worker’s wage equals
the value of her marginal product, epikt+αik . We thus abstract from any job-level rents that may arise in the presence
of search frictions.
8We do not claim to identify any aggregate gains from technological change, and we do not model them here.
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αiA and αiB are independent and both uniformly distributed between zero and some finite but
possibly large number α . We explain in the online appendix that our main results are robust to
alternative assumptions about the joint skills distribution.
In period 2, there is a negative demand shock to occupation A such that piA2−piA1 =−d and
pi2 = d,d > 0. This may be due to labor-replacing technology becoming available, or cheaper,
in occupation A. We are interested in the consequences of the shock for the earnings of workers
who start out in occupation A, under various assumptions about switching costs and anticipation
of the price change. Formally, let li ≡ ❊[yi2|αiA,ki1 = A,DA = 0]−❊[yi2|αiA,ki1 = A,DA = 1]
be the expected earnings loss in period 2 that results from the shock, conditional on worker i
starting out in occupation A, and conditional on her ability (and hence earnings rank) αiA, where
the occurrence of the shock is indicated by DA ∈ {0,1}. Similarly, l
switch
i and l
stay
i denote the
earnings losses further conditioned on leaving and staying, respectively, and pi is the probability
of switching.9 The overall loss is given by
li = l
stay
i − pi
(
l
stay
i − l
switch
i
)
. (1)
As long as there is no displacement then l
stay
i = d and by revealed preference l
switch
i ≤ d, so that
li ≤ d. Thus, switching enables workers to mitigate the losses from occupational decline. In the
online appendix we show that in each version of our model, ∂ pi
∂d
≥ 0, ∂ li
∂d
≥ 0 (with strict inequal-
ities for some i): the larger the drop in demand, the more workers switch, and the higher are
earnings losses. Furthermore, ∂ li
∂αiA
= − ∂ pi
∂αiA
(
l
stay
i − l
switch
i
)
+ pi
∂ lswitchi
∂αiA
. In other words, losses
decrease with initial within-occupation earnings rank if the switching probability is increasing
and the loss of switchers decreasing in initial earnings rank, ∂ pi
∂αiA
> 0 and
∂ lswitchi
∂αiA
< 0.
9Formally,
li ≡ li(αiA,d) ≡ ❊[yi2|αiA,ki1 = A,DA = 0]−❊[yi2|αiA,ki1 = A,DA = 1],
lswitchi ≡ l
switch
i (αiA,d) ≡ ❊[yi2|αiA,ki1 = A,DA = 0]−❊[yi2|αiA,ki1 = A,ki2 = B,DA = 1],
l
stay
i ≡ l
stay
i (αiA,d) ≡ ❊[yi2|αiA,ki1 = A,DA = 0]−❊[yi2|αiA,ki1 = A,ki2 = A,DA = 1],
pi ≡ pi(αiA,d) ≡ P(ki2 = B|ki1 = A,αiA,DA = 1).
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We start with the simplest case, where occupational prices pikt are revealed at the start of
each period and there are no switching costs. Hence, occupational choice is a sequence of static
decisions that can be analyzed in isolation. Panel (a) of Figure 1 illustrates occupational choices
in the two periods as a function of workers’ skills. The set of workers who start out in occupation
A but then switch to B is indicated by the blue area in the figure. Given uniformly distributed
skills, the figure shows that ∂ pi
∂αiA
≤ 0. We show in the online appendix that also
∂ lswitchi
∂αiA
≥ 0, and
that ∂ li
∂αiA
> 0: mean losses from occupational decline increase with initial earnings.
To understand the intuition for these results, call occupation A “typist” and occupation B
“cashier”, where typists suffer a negative demand shock. The worst typists could only become
the worst cashiers, otherwise they would have chosen to be cashiers in period 1. But the best
typists can at most become the best cashiers, and in general they will not all be the best cashiers.
Therefore, the best typists are less able to mitigate their earnings losses by becoming cashiers,
and they suffer larger losses than the worst typists. This argument suggests that switching
probabilities are decreasing and earnings losses are increasing in ability under a large set of
alternative assumptions on the skill distributions.
Next, we assume there is a constant switching cost c ∈ (0,d) for moving from occupation A
to B. Occupational choice is no longer a period-by-period decision. Instead, workers choose in
period 1 the occupation with the highest expected present discounted value of log earnings, net
of switching costs. Let us assume that occupational log prices follow a random walk, ❊[pi2] =
pi1 = 0, where the last equality is due to our earlier simplifying assumption.
10 Panel (b) of
Figure 1 shows that occupational choices are qualitatively similar to the baseline model, except
that the blue region marking the workers who switch is smaller than in panel (a). Again we have
∂ li
∂αiA
> 0.
Instead of a constant switching cost, let us now assume that the cost for moving from A to
B equalsC−αiB, withC > α . This structure of switching costs captures in a reduced form way
the frictions that occupational moves may entail: for example, job search may take time, and
those more able in the new occupation may find a job more quickly. We continue to assume
10Instead of the random walk assumption we could impose that demand changes are somehow otherwise per-
fectly unforeseen, for instance due to adaptive expectations (in the online appendix we consider the case where
demand changes are anticipated).
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that occupational log prices follow a random walk. Panel (c) of Figure 1 shows that low-ability
workers do not leave occupation A, and among high-ability workers, ∂ pi
∂αiA
> 0. We show in
the online appendix that
∂ lswitchi
∂αiA
< 0 (taking into account earnings losses due to the time cost
of switching), so that ∂ li
∂αiA
≤ 0: mean losses from occupational decline (weakly) decrease with
initial earnings.
In terms of the example above, in this case the worst typists do not switch, because their
initial choice of occupation A reveals not only low earnings potential in occupation B but also
a large switching cost. Among the best typists, however, many possess substantial earnings
potential as cashiers, as well as low switching costs. Therefore, the best typists are on average
better able to mitigate their earnings losses by becoming cashiers, and hence the earnings losses
from the demand shock are smaller for the best typists than for the worst typists.11
Building on the previous case, we now explore a version of the model that includes invol-
untary job displacement. Suppose that workers who start in occupation A experience job dis-
placement with some probability that is independent of skill, and also incur a time cost C−αiA
to find a job in occupation A. Here we have in mind exogenous job losses, for instance due to
plant closure, which are a standard feature of search models (see for instance Pissarides, 2000).
There is a fraction of high-ability workers who switch occupation regardless of displacement.
In addition, now a fraction of low-ability workers also switch, but only if they are displaced.
This is illustrated by the yellow area in panel (c’) of Figure 1. Moreover, the earnings losses
experienced by these displaced movers are larger than those of comparable stayers. This is by
revealed preference: a worker in the yellow region prefers to remain if not displaced, so her
non-displaced counterpart (with the same period-1 earnings) necessarily incurs a lower earn-
ings loss. We show in the online appendix that ∂ li
∂αiA
≤ 0, as before. Unlike in the case without
displacement, however, pi is U-shaped in initial earnings. This is because the probability of a
displacement-induced switch is decreasing, and that of a voluntary one is increasing in initial
earnings. The earnings loss li is again decreasing in initial earnings, as the costs of moving
11While our model excludes occupation-specific human capital, it does allow us to think about some of its
potential implications. For example, if all workers accumulate occupation-specific human capital additively (in
logarithms) the effects are similar to adding constant switching costs, since switching means foregoing this capital.
And if higher ability workers accumulate more occupation-specific human capital they become less occupationally
mobile, in contrast to the case of heterogeneous switching costs discussed above.
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jobs—both within and across occupations—decrease with initial earnings.12
As a final variation on our model, we consider a case where period-2 prices are revealed
to be pi2 = d at the start of period 1. In the presence of switching costs, some workers that
would otherwise have chosen occupation A in period 1 instead start out in occupation B. This
means that the fraction of workers switching after period 1 is smaller, and it could even be zero
if switching costs are large. Since there is less switching, earnings losses are larger than in the
case of unanticipated shocks, for a given d.
We conclude this section by summarizing the main results from our model. The baseline
frictionless model makes three predictions: the probability of leaving a declining occupation
is decreasing in initial earnings; earnings losses due to occupational decline are increasing in
initial earnings; and earnings losses of those who leave a declining occupation are less than
the losses of those who remain. Anticipating that these predictions are inconsistent with our
empirical findings, we consider how occupational switching costs can reconcile our results.
Introducing an occupational switching cost that is decreasing in the worker’s earnings in the
destination occupation, leads to a positive relationship between switching probabilities and ini-
tial earnings, and a negative relationship between earnings losses and initial earnings. Allowing
for displacement, together with a cost of switching jobs within an occupation, implies that
switchers’ earnings losses may be larger than those of stayers. Moreover, displacement can
cause switching probabilities to be U-shaped in initial earnings, whereby low-earning workers
switch involuntarily if displaced, while high-earning workers switch voluntarily regardless of
displacement.
3 Data
Our main empirical analysis uses individual-level longitudinal administrative data covering the
entire population of Sweden for several decades, and various editions of the Occupational Out-
look Handbook (OOH) published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Some of our analysis
12We have also analyzed displacement under constant switching costs, that is, when workers incur a time cost
ĉ > 0 to find a new job in A, or a cost c to find a job in B. This case is illustrated by panel (b’) of Figure 1, and
details are given in the online appendix.
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also uses the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, which covers a sample of US residents, as
well as other sources. Here we discuss key elements of the data we use, and leave many of the
details to the online appendix.
3.1 Data sources
Our primary sources for measuring occupational decline are the 1986-87 and the 2018-19 edi-
tions of the Occupational Outlook Handbook (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1986, 2018). The
OOH describes the nature of work, the number of jobs, and the projected employment growth
for hundreds of occupations. For a subset of these occupations, more details are reported, in-
cluding (among much else) data on whether technology is expected to affect—or has already
affected—the occupation in question, and if so in what way. In the 1986-87 edition, 401 occu-
pations are described, covering about 80 percent of US employment. Detailed information is
available for 196 of these occupations, covering about 60 percent of employment.13
Our main outcomes of interest come from Swedish micro data. We obtain basic demo-
graphic (year of birth, gender, education, and county of residence) and labor market (employ-
ment status, annual earnings, and industry) variables from the Integrated Database for Labour
Market Research (LISA), a collection of administrative registers. For 1985-2013, LISA con-
tains one observation per year for every individual aged 16-64 living in Sweden. Key variables,
such as employment status and industry (as well as county of residence) are measured each
November. We also use individual data from the Swedish Public Employment Service (PES),
which contain information on the number of days registered as unemployed and number of days
spent in retraining programs administered by the PES, for all individuals ever registered with
the PES from 1992-2013.
To assess balance between treatment and control groups in terms of pre-determined charac-
teristics, we use information on cognitive skills (an IQ-type measure) and non-cognitive skills
(capturing psychological traits such as the ability to cope with stress) from the military en-
listment. These data are described in detail by Lindqvist and Vestman (2011). We also use
13The number of distinct occupations in the OOH, as well as the number of occupations covered in detail,
increased over time, so our crosswalk from the 1986-87 to the 2018-19 OOH is mostly, though not always, one-to-
many.
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information on parents’ education and income from the 1985 version of LISA.
Our data on workers’ occupations come from the population censuses, which were con-
ducted every five years from 1960-1990, and from the Wage Structure Statistics (WSS) for the
years 1996-2013.14 The WSS contains the population of public sector workers and a sample of
about 50 percent of private sector workers. We apply sampling weights when working with the
occupation variable from the WSS.
A useful feature of our data is that in the 1985 and 1990 censuses, workers’ occupation
is coded using a 5-digit classification, YRKE5, containing about 1,400 distinct occupations.
This allows us to accurately merge occupation-level information from the US, as we describe
below. Unfortunately, such detailed occupation codes are not available after 1990. From 1996-
2013, a 3-digit classification containing 172 distinct codes, SSYK96, is available in the WSS.
This classification is different from YRKE5, and the cross-walk between YRKE5 and SSYK96
likely introduces measurement error in workers’ occupations after 1990. This limits our analysis
of occupational employment shifts and individual workers’ occupational mobility during 1985-
2013.
Finally, we use information from the 1960 census, which allows us to calculate prior oc-
cupational employment changes at the 3-digit level using the YRKE3 classification, a coarser
version of YRKE5 (there are 229 distinct codes that cover the period 1960-85).
While our main analysis focuses on outcomes in Sweden, we also use US panel data from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY 1979) to replicate the main analysis for the
US. We leave the detailed discussion of these data to the online appendix.
3.2 Construction of key variables
To construct our measure of occupational decline we begin with the OOH data. Mapping occu-
pations across the 1986-87 and 2018-19 editions of the of the OOH, we calculate the percent-
age growth in employment 1984-2016.15 If, after a careful search, a 1986-87 occupation has
no counterpart in the 2018-19 edition, we classify it as having vanished, and assign a percent-
14We also use individual-level earnings data for 1975 and 1980 from the population censuses.
15The 1986-87 OOH reports employment for 1984, while the 2018-19 edition reports 2016 employment.
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age growth of -100.16 While few occupations actually disappeared, some occupations declined
sharply, including both white-collar (typists, drafters, and telephone operators), and blue-collar
(precision assemblers, welders, and butchers) jobs.
We also record the projected employment growth of each occupation from the 1986-87
OOH. The BLS constructs these predictions using a careful and lengthy procedure.17 In the
1986-87 OOH, forecasts were reported in categories: “declining”, “little or no change”, “in-
creasing slower than average”, “increasing about as fast as average”, and “increasing faster than
average”. We create a cardinal predicted growth index assigning these categories the numbers
1-5 (where higher numbers correspond to more positive predicted employment changes). We
report results both from using this index and using the categorical outlook variable.
In order to merge the OOH-based variables to the Swedish data, we map the 401 1986-87
OOH occupations to the 1,396 5-digit Swedish occupation codes available in the 1985 census.
We successfully map 379 US occupations to 1,094 Swedish occupations—we are able to find
corresponding US occupations for 91 percent of Swedish workers in 1985. We map percent-
age changes in US employment 1984-2016, as well as 1986-87 OOH predictions (categorical
and index), to Swedish 5-digit occupations using our crosswalk, applying weights (OOH 1984
employment shares) in the case of many-to-one matches.
We define a Swedish 5-digit occupation as declining if the weighted employment growth
of its corresponding OOH occupations is negative and larger (in absolute magnitude) than 25
percent. We regard this as a sensible threshold: smaller observed declines may result from
measurement error from matching OOH occupations over time. At the same time, we report
robustness checks using a number of alternative thresholds. We also use information from the
OOH to determine whether technology likely played a role in the decline, as we further explain
in the online appendix. In 1985, 13 percent of Swedish employees worked in subsequently
declining occupations, and 8 percent worked in subsequently declining occupations where the
decline is linked to technological change.
16Between the 1986-87 and 2018-19 editions of the OOH, some occupations were split or merged, which we
take into account when computing the percentage growth. See the online appendix for details.
17Veneri (1997) evaluates the ex-post accuracy of the projections used in the 1986-87 OOH, and concludes that
it correctly foresaw most occupational trends, although there were non-trivial cases of error.
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We construct several left-hand side variables that characterize workers’ career outcomes
spanning the years 1986-2013, that is, starting with the first year after we measure treatment
and ending with the last year available in our data. We start by summing up years observed as
employed and real annual labor earnings, obtaining the variables cumulative years employed
and cumulative earnings. Following Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song (2014), we measure nor-
malized cumulative earnings, which is the ratio of cumulative earnings to predicted initial earn-
ings.18 We consider further earnings measures—such as rank, discounted cumulative earnings,
and earnings growth—in robustness checks.
Our measure of long-run occupational mobility is a dummy variable that equals one if the
individual worked in the same 3-digit SSYK96 occupation in 2013 as 1985. It equals zero if
the individual works in a different occupation or is not employed.19 Using the PES data, we
calculate cumulative days spent unemployed and cumulative days spent in retraining during
1992-2013. We define dummy variables for ever unemployed and ever having participated in
retraining. Finally, we calculate the retirement age, where we define retirement as a continuous
spell of zero annual earnings up to and including age 64.20
3.3 Sample restrictions
Our starting sample contains all individuals born between 1921-1969 and hence aged 16-64 (at
some point) in 1985; who were employed in November 1985; whose annual earnings in 1985
were no less than the “base amount” (Swedish: basbelopp) specified by the social security ad-
ministration; and for whom we have the relevant demographic and labor market information.21
18The prediction comes from a regression of log earnings on a quartic in age and dummies for gender, county,
and seven education categories, run separately for each 3-digit SSYK96 occupation in 1985. We divide by pre-
dicted rather than actual initial earnings to eliminate transitory earnings variation, which would introduce an im-
portant role for mean reversion into the distribution of normalized cumulative earnings. Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and
Song (2014) divide cumulative earnings by earnings averaged across four pre-treatment years for the same reason.
Since we do not have annual earnings information prior to 1985, we normalize by predicted earnings instead.
19Our measure of occupational mobility does not capture any temporary exits during the intervening years if
workers returned to their initial occupation. A limitation of our data is that they are not conducive to studying
high-frequency occupational mobility: During the years 1986-1989 and 1991-1995, we do not observe workers’
occupation. And during 1996-2004, the SSYK96 variable contains substantially fewer distinct codes than from
2005 onwards.
20The LISA database includes individuals older than 64 only during later years. Since we do not consistently
observe individuals beyond age 64, we assume for all years that individuals aged 65 or older have retired.
21The base amount is used as an accounting unit when calculating benefits, and it is typically equal to about
three months’ worth of full-time work at the median wage. As we do not observe hours worked or fulltime status,
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There are 3,061,051 individuals fulfilling the above criteria.22 Our baseline sample further re-
stricts the sample to those aged 25-36 in 1985. We drop younger workers, who are less likely to
have settled on an occupation. And we drop middle-aged and older workers from our baseline
sample because we want to focus on workers who did not reach retirement age by 2013, the end
of our period of study, in our main analysis. We analyze these older workers separately.
4 Empirical strategy
4.1 The estimating equations and their interpretation
Our objective is to estimate the consequences of occupational decline for individual workers’
careers. Consider a regression of cumulative career outcomes—such as cumulative years em-
ployed, or cumulative earnings—on an indicator for working in 1985 in occupations that sub-
sequently declined, conditional on a set of controls. The probability limit of the regression
coefficient on the declining indicator can be expressed as a difference in conditional means,
which in turn can be decomposed into the sum of a treatment effect and selection bias,
❊[yik2|ki1 ∈ A,DA = 1,xi1]−❊[yik2|ki1 ∈ B,DB = 0,xi1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Observed difference in conditional means
=
❊[yik2|ki1 ∈ A,DA = 1,xi1]−❊[yik2|ki1 ∈ A,DA = 0,xi1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect of occupational decline; −❊[li] in model
+❊[yik2|ki1 ∈ A,DA = 0,xi1]−❊[yik2|ki1 ∈ B,DB = 0,xi1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection bias
.
(2)
Here, yik2 is the outcome of interest, such as cumulative earnings of individual i (who is em-
ployed in occupation k in 1985) in period 2 (1986 through 2013).23 Our notation separates
declining occupations (A) from non-declining ones (B). D is an indicator for occupational de-
we use the base amount to exclude individuals with little labor market attachment.
22There were 5,281,382 individuals aged 16-64 in Sweden in 1985. Of those, 4,186,512 were employed in
November 1985, and among them, 3,648,034 earned no less than the base amount during 1985. The reduction
to 3,061,051 is due to missing education, industry, or occupation information, including cases where YRKE5
occupations do not have matches in the OOH.
23In this paper we focus on labor market outcomes, and in companion work we study how occupational decline
matters for other socio-economic outcomes, including health, family composition, geographic location, and welfare
transfers.
16
cline, which allows us to consider the hypothetical situation where occupational decline did not
take place. We motivate our use of an indicator for occupational decline in Section 4.2 below.
xi1 is a set of (yet unspecified) controls, which we also revisit below.
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In our model, the selection term equals zero due to the symmetry assumptions we make,
and there is no need for controls. In practice, the identifying assumption for the regressions
without controls is too strong, because the selection term reflects both differences in individuals
sorting across occupations as well as differences between occupations A and B even in absence
of occupation decline. Our empirical strategy aims to mitigate both of these types of selection
concerns.
Our first step towards addressing the sorting of individuals is to control for a rich vector of
individual characteristics in period 1, that is, in 1985: gender, age, educational attainment and
county of residence dummies, and earnings. But a natural question is whether the sorting of
workers makes those in declining occupations differ in unobserved characteristics which may
affect earnings trajectories, such as their cognitive and non-cognitive ability, even conditional
on these controls. Fortunately, we can (and do) address this concern using measures of both
cognitive and non-cognitive skills from the military enlistment, which are available for men of
a subset of cohorts for whom military service was compulsory. We also check whether workers
in declining occupations differ in other background characteristics, namely parental education
and pre-1985 earnings.
But even when the vector of controls xi1 ensures balance in terms of individuals’ unobserved
characteristics, the selection term will be non-zero if earnings growth in occupations A and B
would have been different in the absence of occupational decline—that is, if a worker’s occupa-
tion affects her earnings growth even without occupational decline. To mitigate this concern, we
use data from 1985 to estimate expected occupation-specific lifetime earnings profiles, which
we add as controls to the regressions.
To further control for differences between declining and non-declining occupations, we use
24As in our model, the effects that we estimate are on the workers in declining occupations relative to other
workers, since we cannot identify the aggregate effects of occupational decline. We do, however, explore the
role of one mechanism through which occupational decline may affect non-declining occupations, namely the
movement of workers into non-declining occupations, as we further discuss in the next section.
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information from the 1986-87 OOH. The BLS authors went to great lengths to accurately fore-
cast occupational employment changes. Once we condition on predicted occupational growth,
we likely remove much of the remaining differences between declining and non-declining oc-
cupations. Since the occupational decline and the forecasts that we use rely on US data, we
also control for each occupation’s level of employment and pre-existing employment growth
trends in Sweden. In some specifications we use two additional sets of controls: broad (1-digit)
occupation dummies and (2-digit) industry dummies. Adding these controls comes at the cost
of reducing the variation in occupational decline, since it only uses variation in occupational de-
cline between very similar occupations. Nevertheless, by gradually adding controls we achieve
plausible bounds on the estimated effects of occupational decline, as we further discuss in the
next section.
Taken together, our estimating equation takes the form
yi2 = βDki1 + γxi1+δwki1 + εi, (3)
where Dki1 is an indicator for working in 1985 an occupation that subsequently declined; xi1
is a vector of individual characteristics, measured in 1985, as discussed above; wk is a vector
of occupational characteristics; and εi is the error term, which we conservatively cluster by
three-digit Swedish occupations.25
We provide further evidence that our identification strategy plausibly addresses the selection
issues by considering two additional sets of outcomes. First, we examine the earnings of work-
ers in the years before the occupational decline that we study. Second, we study the cumulative
earnings during the first few years our study, when the effect of occupational decline were likely
limited.
A different question regarding our approach is whether occupational decline that is specifi-
cally linked to labor-replacing technologies has distinct consequences from demand-driven oc-
cupational decline in general. To provide evidence on the role of technology, we restrict some
of the analysis to occupational declines that are explicitly linked to concrete new technologies,
25As discussed above, some specifications also control for industry fixed effects.
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such as personal computers and robots.
Yet another question about the interpretation of our estimates is whether they can be gener-
alized beyond Sweden. To shed light on this question, we repeat our main analysis using data on
US workers (NLSY 1979), which allows us to study the consequences of occupational decline
in the US context, albeit with more data limitations.
One final step in our empirical analysis is to consider how the costs of occupational decline
may fall differently on workers with different initial earnings rank within their occupations, in
line with the discussion in the model section.
4.2 Rationale for measuring occupational decline using US data
Prior literature has documented that shifts in occupational employment are strongly correlated
across countries, see for instance Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2014) documenting job po-
larization across European countries, and in particular Adermon and Gustavsson (2015) on job
polarization in Sweden. Here we explain why using measures of occupational decline from the
OOH is not only feasible, but also desirable.
We begin by explaining why we prefer this measure of decline to an alternative measure
using the SSYK96 codes. First, there are 401 OOH codes compared to just 172 (three-digit)
SSYK96 codes, and having more codes affords us more variation from small and declining
occupations. For example, it lets us separate typists, whose employment fell sharply, from sec-
retaries, whose employment grew. To use the OOH codes we match them to YRKE5 codes,
but since the YRKE5 are more numerous we do not lose much variation. Second, since the
SSYK96 codes were introduced from 1996 they reflect a judgement on an occupation’s impor-
tance made after the start of the occupational decline that we study. Consequently, SSYK96 are
more likely to pool occupations with low employment in 1996 (including declining ones) with
non-declining occupations. Because the 2018-19 OOH separately describes even occupations
with very low employment, this is less of a problem for our approach. Finally, using occu-
pational declines measured in Sweden as a regressor where the dependent variable is change
in earnings creates a problem of simultaneity. This problem is mitigated by using the OOH
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measure.
At this stage readers may also ask: why do we report reduced form results using the OOH
decline measure rather than use it as an instrument for occupational decline measured in Swe-
den using SSYK96? Our rationale for the reduced form approach is that it preserves much more
of the variation that we are interested in, for several reasons. First, as noted above, if we use
measures based on SSYK96 codes, we lose much of the variation in occupational decline be-
cause of the coarseness of the classifications and the lower likelihood of separating occupations
in decline. Second, 2SLS would exacerbate this problem, since it only uses part of the varia-
tion in the decline. Finally, as we show below, while we still have power to detect changes in
occupational decline in Sweden, once we control for predicted changes we are left with a weak
instrument.
Still another question is why we focus only on occupational declines instead of using the
full variation in OOH occupational change. Again there are several factors that influence our
choice. First, declines are interesting from the perspective of their social costs and policy im-
plications. Second, large declines in employment are likely driven by declines in labor demand,
whereas increases in employment may also reflect shifts in labor supply. Finally, as we explain
below, we use different cutoffs in the regressions as well as graphical evidence to show that
the costs of occupational change are concentrated among those who experience substantial oc-
cupational declines; increases or moderate declines seem to matter little relative to each other.
Nevertheless, for completeness we also report estimates using the full variation in occupational
changes.
To conclude, we note that while our reduced form estimates on their own do not deliver
immediately interpretable magnitudes, we are able to assess the quantitative importance of say,
estimated earnings losses, by relating them to the estimated impacts on occupational mobility,
and also, to the difference in employment growth between declining and non-declining occu-
pations. Of course, our discussion above suggests that our estimates on occupational change
and mobility in Sweden may understate the true extent of these changes, since they rely on the
SSYK96 classification.
20
5 Empirical analysis
In this section we present the findings from our empirical analysis. First, we quantify occupa-
tional decline in Sweden and discuss sorting into declining occupations. Second, we study how
employment, earnings, and occupational mobility differed for workers in declining occupations.
Third, we investigate how the consequences of occupational decline differed by workers’ initial
within-occupation earnings rank. Fourth, we explore some of the mechanisms through which
occupational decline operates, including unemployment, retraining, and early retirement. Fifth,
we examine whether occupational declines with observed links to technology has distinct con-
sequences. Sixth, we repeat the main elements of our analysis using NLSY panel data from
the US. At the end of this section, we interpret our findings through the lens of the theoretical
model from Section 2.
5.1 Occupational decline and sorting across occupations
We begin by quantifying workers’ exposure to occupational decline. In Table 1 we report esti-
mates of equation (3), where the dependent variable is log employment change from 1985-2013
in each worker’s three-digit occupation. Panel A shows estimates for workers aged 16-64 in
1985, and Panel B focuses on our main sample of workers—those aged 25-36 in 1985. The re-
sults, which are similar across panels, suggest that workers in declining occupations are exposed
to a log employment change that is about 50 log points lower than for workers in non-declining
ones; about 40 log points lower when we compare observationally similar workers; and lower
by about 20-30 log points when we also include occupation and industry controls. It is impor-
tant to keep these results in mind when interpreting our findings from putting individual-level
career outcomes on the left-hand side of equation (3). While adding more controls reduces the
risk of omitted variables bias, the results in Table 1 show that this also leaves less variation
in exposure to occupational change. We also note, as discussed in Section 4.2, that these esti-
mates likely understate the employment decline for 5-digit occupations, which we are unable to
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measure.26
Table OA1 reports similar estimates, aggregated by three-digit occupations and weighted by
1985 Swedish employment shares, using our main sample of workers. This table again shows
large declines in Swedish employment in occupations we classified as declining based on the
OOH data, in particular, a difference of about 75 log points between all-declining and none-
declining 3-digit occupations (column (1)).27 Table OA1 also explores the extent to which
declines were predictable in 1985. It shows that the OOH-based predicted growth index has
strong explanatory power for Swedish employment growth (column (3)). Entering the OOH
predictions as categorical variables only marginally improves the forecast, as seen in column
(4). Finally, the difference in employment growth between all-declining and none-declining
3-digit occupations is still about 45 log points when controlling for initial Swedish employment
shares, prior Swedish employment growth, and the OOH predictions, as seen in columns (5)-(6).
Having described the extent of occupational declines, we turn to the sorting of individu-
als in 1985 into subsequently declining occupations. Table 2 presents results from regressions
of several individual characteristics on an intercept and the declining indicator. The top panel
considers the entire working-age population with non-missing demographic and labor market
information, and the bottom panel focuses on our main sample. In both cases, the sorting pat-
terns are similar: those in occupations that subsequently declined were of similar age, and more
likely to be male, less educated, and more likely to be employed in manufacturing. Coinciden-
tally, the gender gap in earnings is offset by the differences in schooling, and on net, the workers
in subsequently declining occupations had similar earnings to others in 1985.
We next investigate whether there is sorting into declining occupations based on cognitive
skills, non-cognitive skills, and parental attributes, and if so, whether any differences in these
26The difference of 50 log points translates into an employment decline of about 18 percent. Let yi be the log
employment change assigned to each individual based on her 1985 5-digit occupation, and Di be the declining
indicator. From the regression yi = α +βDi + εi we obtain ❊[exp{yi}|Di = 1] = exp{α +β}❊[exp{εi}|Di = 1],
and plugging in our estimnates, exp{0.06− 0.49}× 1.26 = 0.82. As we argue in the text, this likely understates
the actual average decline in the 5-digit occupations.
27The difference in the coefficients between the first columns in Tables 1 and OA1 is to be expected, because
the micro data equivalent of a regression using aggregate data in cases like this is a two-stage lest squares (2SLS)
regression, not an OLS regression. If in the micro data we instrument the declining indicator with the complete
set of 3-digit occupation (SSYK96) dummies, we obtain a coefficient identical to that in column (1) of Table
OA1. However, the results from the OLS regression are easier to interpret and to relate to our results from putting
individual-level outcomes on the left-hand side.
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variables disappear once we control for the individual characteristics described in the previous
paragraph. Columns (1) and (4) in panel A of Table 3 show that in 1985, the cognitive and
non-cognitive skills of men in subsequently declining occupations were lower than those of the
other men by about 0.2-0.25 standard deviations. However, these differences shrink and become
insignificant once we add the individual controls (columns (2) and (5)), and are essentially elim-
inated when we also include industry and occupation controls (columns (3) and (6)). Panels B
and C repeat the analysis for mothers’ and fathers’ schooling and earnings in 1985, which have
the advantage of being available for women as well as men. The pattern is qualitatively very
similar to that of the military skill measures: working in a subsequently declining occupation
is associated with lower parental schooling and earnings, but these differences disappear once
adding controls. In sum, Table 3 suggests that, although there is negative selection into occu-
pations that later decline, most of this selection can be mitigated using suitable controls such
as education and 1985 earnings. To the extent that minor negative selection persists in the re-
gressions with individual controls, these regressions may slightly overstate the negative effect
of occupational decline on workers, but this is not a concern once we add all the controls.
As a final check for sorting into declining occupations, we investigate earnings in 1980 for
the older cohorts in our baseline sample (individuals aged 25-31 in 1980).28 Again we find
that conditional on individual-level characteristics, there are essentially no differences in prior
earnings, as seen in Figure OA2. Taken together, the results in this section suggest that con-
cerns about sorting into declining occupations are largely alleviated when we include suitable
controls.
5.2 Main results on employment, earnings, and occupational mobility
Table 4 reports results from estimating equation (3) using our main sample of workers aged 25-
36 in 1985. Panel A shows that workers in declining occupations spent about nine fewer months
(0.73 fewer years) in employment from 1986-2013 (column (1)). Once we add individual con-
trols, this estimate reduces to about six months, or about two percent of the sample mean of
28Earnings data for the population of Swedish workers are not available at annual frequency prior to 1985. We
obtain prior earnings from the population censuses, which were carried out every five years until 1990.
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about 23 years (column (2)). Next, we add more controls and compare those who experienced
occupational declines to observationally similar workers in similar occupations and industries.
These specifications suggests that the losses from occupational decline averaged about two
months (0.2 years) of employment, or about one percent of the sample mean (columns (3)-(6)).
Panel B of Table 4 reports results from using cumulative earnings 1986-2013 as the out-
come. Column (1) shows that working in a declining occupation was associated with 350,000
Swedish Krona (SEK) lower cumulative earnings, or about 5 percent of the sample mean.29
When including individual controls, the estimated loss is similar, though the confidence inter-
val is much tighter (column (2)). Further adding occupational controls cuts the loss to less than
two percent of the sample mean.
In panel C we examine earnings losses from occupational decline using an alternative earn-
ings measure: cumulative earnings divided by predicted initial earnings (see Section 3.2 for
details on the construction of this variable). Depending on the controls included, the estimated
losses in cumulative earnings range from around 100 to 220 percent of initial annual earnings,
or from 2.5-5.7 percent in terms of the sample mean, quite similar to the results in panel B.30
In Figure 2, we present a dynamic counterpart to the results reported in panel B, columns (2)
and (6) of Table 4. Here we use as outcomes each year’s earnings and cumulative earnings from
1986 up to the year indicated on the horizontal axis of each chart. The top right panel of Figure
2 is suggestive of a smooth process of occupational decline, with earnings losses building up
gradually. However, the top left panel reveals that losses in annual earnings suffered by workers
in declining occupations were larger during the 1990s and late-2000s recessions. The picture
is similar when we divide the coefficients by the mean of cumulative earnings at each horizon
(bottom panels). As before, the losses are smaller when we include occupation and industry
controls.
Next, we investigate occupational mobility. Table 5 reports estimates of equation (3) with
29We inflate all SEK figures to 2014 levels. Average annual earnings of Swedish workers, conditional on being
employed in November and earning at least the base amount during the year, were SEK190,200 in 1985 and
SEK330,800 in 2013, in terms of 2014SEK. We do not express these amounts in USD due to exchange rate
fluctuations. For instance, SEK1,000 were worth about USD150 in January 2014, but about USD130 in December
2014, and about USD110 in October 2018.
30Below we discuss results using alternative functional forms for cumulative earnings.
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indicators for working in 2013 in the same occupation as in 1985 (or in a similar ones) as
outcomes. As we do not want to condition the sample on being employed in 2013 (which
is also an outcome), we have that ‘not remaining’ in the same occupation could reflect either
occupational switching or non-employment, a point to which we return below.
Column (1) in panel A of Table 5 shows that the probability of remaining in the same 3-
digit occupation was around 14 percentage points lower in declining occupations, compared to a
mean of 29 percent in our sample. In other words, by 2013 a little over 70 percent of all workers
had left their 1985 occupations (or left employment altogether), and the probability of staying in
the same occupation was roughly halved for those starting in declining occupations. When we
compare observationally similar workers, occupational decline appears to reduce the probability
of remaining in the 1985 occupation by 11 percentage points, and when further restricting the
comparison to similar occupations and industries, the estimate falls to 4.5 percentage points.
Panels (B) and (C) of Table 5 show similar, albeit somewhat smaller, coefficients when we look
at the probability of remaining in more broadly defined (2-digit or 1-digit) occupations. It is
noteworthy that even when we consider 1-digit occupations, only about 40 percent of the sample
remained in the same broadly defined occupation over the 28-year period that we study.31
Having presented our main results on career employment, career earnings, and occupational
mobility, we now return to the issues of interpretation alluded to in Section 4.1. Our results
from including individual, occupation, and industry controls (column (6) in Tables 4 and 5)
plausibly provide us with conservative estimates of the losses from occupational decline—about
2 percent of mean cumulative earnings over 28 years—given the balance of pre-determined
characteristics conditional on these controls, as well as the fact that no earnings losses appear
in the first 5-10 years (Figure 2). As argued in Section 5.1, the specification only controlling for
individual characteristics (column (2) in Tables 4 and 5) may slightly overstate the losses from
occupational decline—5 percent of mean cumulative earnings—as it leaves minor differences
in some of the pre-determined characteristics. In addition, Figure 2 shows earnings losses based
on this specification already in the years immediately after 1985. On the other hand, we have
31For related discussions of the importance of switching occupations in the presence of technological change,
see Cortes (2016) and Caselli and Manning (2018).
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also seen that the variation in occupational decline is much reduced when including occupation
and industry controls (columns (2) and (6) in Table 1). While larger declines going together with
larger losses and mobility is consistent with our theoretical model, we note that the reduction in
employment declines is about 50 percent between the two specifications in Table 1, whereas the
coefficients for individual employment, earnings, and mobility mostly decline by more than 50
percent. In conclusion, we consider 2-5 percent of mean cumulative earnings to be a credible
range of estimates of the losses from occupational decline.
5.2.1 Robustness of main results
Our first set of robustness checks relates to the choice of functional form of occupational de-
cline. The declining indicator is based on a 25-percent cutoff, conservatively identifying oc-
cupations whose (US) employment fell substantially since the mid 1980s. We also explore a
range of alternative cutoffs and find that higher cutoffs (in the sense of isolating larger employ-
ment declines) usually result in larger estimated losses and mobility responses. In addition,
our results are very similar when we exclude occupations that grew rapidly from the control
group (see Table OA2 for both sets of results). While we focus on a binary definition of oc-
cupational decline as motivated in Section 4.2, we also explore the relationships between our
key outcomes of interest and the full variation in US and Swedish employment growth. The
(residualized) associations of cumulative earnings and occupational mobility with occupational
employment growth are mostly flat apart from a drop in occupations that declined substantially
(see Figures OA3 and OA4, and corresponding regression results in Table OA3).
With a second set of robustness checks we aim to address the risk of underestimating the
losses from occupational decline. The magnitude of our estimated earnings losses may be un-
derstated because workers who leave declining occupations flock to similar non-declining oc-
cupations, depressing the wage in these ‘control’ occupations. And even in the absence of such
general equilibrium effects, employing a rich set of controls may cause us to put more weight on
groups of comparable occupations where there are roughly as many declining as non-declining
sub-occupations. In such cases, workers may have many substitute occupations to choose from,
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so our estimates may understate the true average treatment effect. To mitigate these concerns,
we run what we refer to as ‘doughnut’ specifications, namely the same regressions as those we
report in Tables 4 and 5 but excluding 3-digit (SSYK96) occupations in which some but not all
5-digit occupations are declining. We indeed estimate larger earnings losses than in our baseline
specifications, but only slightly so, ranging from 3-6 percent of mean earnings (see Tables OA4
and OA5).
Finally, our conclusions about earnings losses are robust to using different functional forms
of earnings, as we discuss further in the next sub-section.
5.3 Heterogeneity by within-occupation earnings rank
We now examine how employment and earnings losses from occupational decline varied by
initial within-occupation earnings rank. We estimate equation (3) allowing the coefficient on
the declining indicator to vary by earnings rank, and report the results in Table 6. Panel A
shows that lower ranked workers suffered larger employment and earnings losses than average
as a result of occupational decline (columns (1)-(6)): the coefficients on the interaction of the
declining indicator with earnings rank are positive and precisely estimated. Moreover, these
estimates barely change when we add occupation and industry controls over individual-level
controls, though the main coefficients on the declining dummy—giving the employment and
earnings loss for the median worker—are affected by the inclusion of additional controls. The
magnitudes implied by the interaction coefficients are meaningful and imply, for instance, that
compared to the 25th-percentile, the 75th-percentile worker suffered a 5-percent lower employ-
ment loss and a 6.5-percent lower earnings loss (both in terms of the overall mean).
This pattern is robust to alternative specifications that replace the linear rank measures with
dummies for the bottom and top terciles. This specification also allows us to characterize losses
for low-ranked workers directly. Panel B of Table 6 shows that workers at the bottom tercile of
their starting occupations’ earnings distributions suffered employment losses of 1.2-1.4 years
(5.5-6.5 percent of mean employment in the bottom tercile) and earnings losses of around 8-11
percent of bottom-tercile mean earnings. Indeed, the estimates of mean losses reported in the
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previous sub-section mask more substantial losses for low earners (within an occupation). Our
findings about earnings losses are robust to a number of alternative ways of measuring career
earnings, as shown in Table OA6.32
The pattern for the probability of remaining in the initial occupation appears to be non-
monotonic: among the workers in declining occupations, both bottom-tercile and top-tercile
workers were less likely to remain in their starting occupations (panel B, columns (7)-(8)).
These interaction coefficients are larger than ten percent of the overall mean (although in the
case of the top tercile, not precisely estimated). This hump-shaped pattern of staying proba-
bilities (U-shaped in exiting probabilities) is intriguing from a theoretical point of view, as we
discuss below.
One potential challenge in interpreting the results of Table 6 is that those with low earnings
in their occupation may have differed from others along some observable dimensions, such
as gender, age, or geography. To mitigate this concern, we re-estimate the regressions using
workers’ within-occupation rank in residualized earnings, where the residuals come from a
regression of earnings on female, cohort, and county-of-residence dummies. As Table OA7
shows, in terms of employment and earnings losses the results are qualitatively unchanged,
and the magnitude of the interaction coefficients is only slightly reduced. However, using the
residual-based rank measure, there is less support for the conclusion that bottom-ranked workers
were less likely to remain in the initial occupation.
We now briefly examine earnings losses separately for those who remained in their initial
occupation and those who did not. This purely descriptive exercise is motivated by the pre-
diction of our baseline model in Section 2 that leavers should have lower losses than stayers.
We estimate equation (3) with cumulative earnings as the outcome variable, and add on the
right-hand side a dummy for having remained in the initial occupation, as well as its interac-
tion with the declining dummy. Panel A of Table OA8 shows that among all workers, those
who remained in their initial occupation had higher cumulative earnings, though in panel B we
32We consider discounted cumulative earnings, applying a 5-percent discount rate; discounted cumulative earn-
ings normalized by initial earnings; the percentile rank in cumulative earnings; the log of cumulative earnings; and
the percentage change in earnings 1985-2013. As expected, the estimated losses in terms of discounted cumulative
earnings are somewhat smaller at 1.5-4.5 percent of the overall mean, depending on controls, as more weight is
put on earlier years in the career.
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restrict the sample to those who were employed in 2013, and the finding reverses.33 Impor-
tantly, in neither case is there evidence that those who remained in declining occupations did
significantly worse than those who left a declining occupation. The same result holds when we
focus on the bottom third (in terms of within-occupation earnings), see panel C. We discuss the
interpretation of these results in light of the model in Section 5.7 below.
5.4 Unemployment, retraining, and early retirement
A natural question at this stage is to what extent the loss in years of employment due to occupa-
tional decline is accounted for by increased unemployment and retraining; as discussed above,
data on these last two outcomes are available for the final 22 years of our study. Table 7 re-
ports estimates using the main specifications from Tables 4 and 6 but this time using cumulative
days of unemployment (panel A) and state-sponsored retraining (panel B) as outcome variables.
Columns (1)-(4) of Panel A show that workers who started out in later declining occupations
were only very slightly more likely to ever be unemployed, and columns (5)-(8) suggest that
these workers accumulated 20-50 more unemployment days, though the estimates with more
controls are imprecise. However, we again find substantial heterogeneity, with bottom-tercile
workers in declining occupations spending 63 days more in unemployment, a substantial 20
percent of the mean.
Columns (1)-(4) of panel B suggest that occupational decline increased the risk of ever
enrolling in state-sponsored retraining by 9-27 percent. The estimates for cumulative days
spent retraining are similarly substantial, at least in relative terms (columns (5)-(8)). Our most
conservative specification including all controls suggest that the median worker spent six more
days in retraining, which amounts to 21 percent of the mean (ten days and 29 percent for the
bottom-tercile worker).
Our estimates for unemployment and retraining can only explain part of the estimated em-
ployment losses. For bottom-tercile workers, we conservatively estimate an employment loss
33Workers classified as having remained are employed in 2013 by construction, whereas those classified as not
having remained might not have been employed in 2013 and thus have zero earnings in that year, and possibly in
preceding years also.
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of 1.16 years.34 Of these, unemployment and retraining account for only 22 percent.35 The
remaining employment loss may be accounted for by job search that is not covered by unem-
ployment benefits; private retraining; or time spent outside the labor force. Unfortunately, we
lack the data to investigate this further.
There is however a group of workers for whom we are able to investigate the relationship
between occupational decline and exit from the labor force, namely, older workers. Recall
that workers in our baseline sample reached a maximum age of 64 in 2013. We now examine
employment, earnings, and retirement for two groups of older workers, most of whom reached
the usual retirement age of 65 well before the end of our sample period.
Panel A of Table 8 considers workers who were aged 37-48 in 1985. The employment
losses among this group are a little larger than for our baseline sample: about 8 months (4
months) of a year of employment in the specification with individual (all) controls, or just under
4 percent (2 percent) of the group mean. About half of these employment losses are accounted
for by a slightly younger age of retirement for those in declining occupations. The estimated
earnings losses from occupational decline—about 6 percent (1.5 percent) with individual (all)
controls—are similar to those of the baseline group. Finally, for this group we also find positive
and significant interactions of the declining dummy with initial occupational earnings rank,
suggesting once more that those who earned least within their occupation to begin with lost
more years of employment from occupational decline.
Panel B of Table 8 suggests that for an even older group, those aged 49-60 in 1985, the
occupational decline that we measure had more modest costs compared to the baseline group.
This likely reflects the fact that we are measuring occupational decline over a longer period, and
that these older workers had little exposure to the decline.36
34From panel B, column (2) in Table 6 we obtain−0.03−1.13=−1.16. To complete the calculation, we divide
the unemployment and retraining coefficients by 365 to get years, multiply them by 28/22 to account for the fact
that these variables are only available during 1992-2013, sum them, and divide by 1.16.
35Of the mean employment loss, unemployment and retraining explain about a third and a tenth of the time
respectively.
36We verify that for the groups of middle-aged and older workers, our declining indicator does not predict
differences in prior earnings (1975 and 1980) conditional on controls, see Figure OA2.
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5.5 Technology-related occupational decline
Consistent with much of the literature (Goos, Manning, and Salomons, 2014) we expect tech-
nological change to be a key driver of occupational decline, and especially occupational decline
that is common to the US and Sweden. Nevertheless, there could be other drivers, including
changes one the supply side (changes in demographics, trade shocks, or changes in govern-
ment policy) and in consumer demand. Bearing this in mind, we now focus on occupations
that are likely to have declined due to the introduction of labor-replacing technology, based on
information from the OOH, as described in Section 3.2.37
We find that workers’ exposure to declines in Swedish occupational employment is of very
similar magnitude regardless of whether we consider all occupations classified as declining, or
only the ones we linked to technology (Table OA10, panel A, and Table OA11).38 Moreover,
technology-related occupational declines are not significantly different from other occupational
declines in their implications for years of employment, cumulative earnings, and the probabil-
ity of remaining in the initial occupation. One way to see this is by adding an indicator for
technology-linked decline to equation (3). We find that the coefficients on this indicator are
statistically indistinguishable from zero (columns (1) and (2) in panels B-D of Table OA10).
Alternatively, considering technology-related declines on their own, we see very similar point
estimates, both for the main effect and for the interaction with earnings rank, as for the full set
of declines (columns (3)-(5)).
5.6 Studying occupational decline in the US using NLSY data
An important question is to what extent the magnitudes of the earnings and employment losses
that we estimate are specific to Sweden and its institutional setting. We aim to answer this
question using US data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY 1979). In this
analysis we try to stay as close as possible to the specifications we estimate for Sweden, but
37Some of what we classify as technology-related decline may still be influenced by other factors, and we cannot
rule out that technology played a role in the remaining declining occupations.
38Workers starting out in 1985 in subsequently declining occupations, where we were able to identify a link to
technology, were statistically indistinguishable from those in the remaining declining occupations, as seen in Table
OA9.
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some changes are necessary due to data limitations. The NLSY cohorts are younger than those
we study in Sweden, so we set 1987 (instead of 1985) as the base year. This way it is still
reasonable to use the same OOH data that we use for Sweden while allowing the youngest
workers to have reached age 22 in the base year. This means that the cohorts we study in
the NLSY are likely less attached to the labor force, but for the most part are likely to have
completed college (if taking any). The geographic information in the NLSY is also limited, so
we use region dummies instead of county dummies as controls. To ensure a sufficient sample
size, we use the 1980 US census to construct occupational life cycle earnings profiles, and
where necessary we impute earnings for years where they are not reported. Other aspects of the
NLSY are discussed in the online appendix.
To shed light on how occupational decline shaped earnings in the US, Table OA12 reports
estimates of specifications similar to those in panel B of Table 4. We estimate different spec-
ifications, and in all cases our point estimates are close to zero. While the estimates are quite
imprecise, in our preferred specification the 95-percent confidence intervals exclude losses of
7 percent or more. We note that this is larger in magnitude than our main point estimate for
Sweden, but a little smaller than the point estimate for the bottom tercile in Sweden.
There are several possible reasons why the NLSY estimates may be less precise than those
we obtain using the Swedish data. First, the NLSY sample is only a small fraction of the
US population, and the sample size is around two orders of magnitude smaller than the Swedish
data. Second, workers in the NLSYwere on average younger in the base year, and therefore may
have been less attached to their starting occupation. Third, NLSY earnings are self-reported,
while those in Sweden come from administrative records. Fourth, the NLSY suffers from more
attrition and non-reporting compared to Sweden’s administrative data. Finally, there may be
other aspects of measurement that differ across the two countries (such as the measurement of
occupations).39,40
The picture is similar for cumulative weeks employed and unemployed as outcomes. The
39We also do not find significant interactions with occupation-specific rank, likely because of a lack of power
given the much smaller NLSY sample.
40Figure OA5 uses the US NLSY data to repeat (as closely as possible) Figure 2 for Sweden. In the US, like
in Sweden, the confidence intervals widen a little over time, but the US data show no clear trend for the point
estimates.
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estimates are for the most part imprecise, and the point estimates suggest that those in declining
occupations spent a slightly larger fraction of their time in both employment and unemploy-
ment (compared to non-employment). The 95-percent confidence intervals exclude losses of
2 percent or more, which is again broadly consistent with our findings for Sweden (see Table
OA13). Finally, we find some suggestive evidence that occupational decline made it less likely
that workers remained in their 3-digit starting occupation (Table OA14).
5.7 Interpreting our findings through the lens of the theoretical model
We now discuss how our results relate to the insights from the theoretical model presented in
Section 2. Our model assumes that occupational decline results from adverse demand shocks,
so that affected workers suffer relative earnings losses and are more likely to exit their occu-
pations. In our empirical analysis, we confirm that occupational decline was indeed associated
with earnings losses and higher exit rates. Our results therefore support our interpretation that
the occupational decline that we study was largely driven by changes in demand, as our model
assumes. In the model we also assume that the losses suffered by those in declining occupations
are determined in equilibrium, and if occupational labor demand is downward sloping, then an
occupational labor supply response may cushion these losses. Our finding that earnings losses
in declining occupations were associated with significant outflows from these occupations sug-
gests that this mechanism may be relevant in our context.
Several of our findings are inconsistent with the predictions of the frictionless version of
the model: we find that the probability of leaving declining occupations was not decreasing in
initial occupational earnings rank; earnings losses due to occupational decline were decreasing
(rather than increasing) in initial earnings rank; and earnings losses of those who left declining
occupations were higher (rather than lower) than the losses of those who remained.
Our empirical results are more consistent with the version of the model that allows for
occupational switching costs that decrease in workers’ abilities in the destination occupation,
since this can account for our finding that those with lower initial within-occupation earnings
rank suffered larger earnings losses as a result of occupational decline.
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When we allow for both differential occupational switching costs (as above) and displace-
ment, we can account for several findings at the same time. In this case, those with lower initial
within-occupation earnings rank suffer larger earnings losses as a result of occupational decline;
switchers’ earnings losses may be larger than those of stayers (as we find); and displacement
may lead to switching probabilities that are U-shaped in initial earnings, whereby low-earning
workers switch if displaced, while high-earning workers switch voluntarily.
Our empirical analysis also sheds light on the nature of the occupational switching costs
in the model. In practice we find that roughly a third of the employment years lost can be
accounted for by increased unemployment, and almost ten percent are due to retraining. The
stronger responses to occupational decline of unemployment and retraining among lower-ranked
workers further supports our interpretation of heterogeneous switching costs.
Finally, our model suggests that the effects of an adverse occupational demand shock may
differ depending on whether the shock was anticipated. We find that unanticipated declines are
generally associated with smaller earnings losses and smaller mobility responses. The former is
consistent with our model, but the latter is not. A possible explanation may be that conditional
on predicted occupational employment growth, our declining indicator isolates a lower level of
exposure to actual Swedish employment declines than in the unconditional regression, or the
one only conditioning on individual characteristics.41
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the long-run employment and earnings losses that workers suffer when
demand for their occupations declines. We begin by measuring anticipated and actual occu-
pational declines in the US, which we map into panel micro data on Swedish workers. We
find that even after controlling for key predictors of occupational decline, employment changes
in declining Swedish occupations were around 20-40 log points lower than in non-declining
occupations.
Despite this large fall in employment, we find that over 28 years, those who in 1985 worked
41However, exposure declines by less than the mobility response, in relative terms. See columns (2) and (4) in
Tables 1 and 4.
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in declining occupations experienced earnings (employment) losses that were around 2-5 (1-2)
percent of mean cumulative earnings (employment), compared to those who initially worked in
non-declining occupations. The earnings losses are on the higher end of the above-mentioned
range when we control only for individual covariates, and lower when we also control for an-
ticipated occupational changes and industry and occupation characteristics. Around a third of
the cumulative employment losses are accounted for by increased unemployment, and a further
tenth by increased time spent in government retraining. Further evidence from a panel of US
workers, while noisier, suggests that mean employment and earnings losses were no larger than
in Sweden.
We find that workers in the bottom tercile of their occupations’ earnings distributions suf-
fered the largest losses (around 8-11 percent). Workers in the bottom tercile also lost more
years of employment and spent more time in unemployment and retraining. We find that those
in declining occupations were significantly more likely to leave their starting occupations. The
propensity to exit declining occupations was U-shaped in initial occupational earnings rank,
with those at the bottom (and to a lesser extent at the top) more likely to leave their starting
occupations.
We show that our findings are consistent with a Roy model with negative occupational de-
mand shocks, where workers may suffer displacement, and where finding reemployment takes
time. In the model, those at the bottom of a declining occupation also have low earnings ca-
pacity in other occupations, and therefore find it harder to find reemployment—whether in their
own occupations or in other occupations. Hence they lose most from occupational decline. The
model also rationalizes the U-shaped exit pattern that we describe above: those at the bottom of
their occupations’ earnings distributions are more likely to leave their occupations when they
are displaced, while those at the top are more likely to leave to avoid negative demand shocks.
Our findings suggest that the mean losses of occupational decline are lower than the losses
suffered by displaced workers that have been reported in prior literature. This is likely be-
cause occupational decline is typically gradual, and can be partly managed through retirements,
reduced entry into declining occupations, and increased job-to-job exits to other occupations.
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Gradual occupational decline may also impose fewer negative spillovers on local economies
compared to large, sudden shocks, such as plant closures.
At the same time, future occupational decline could still have substantial adverse conse-
quences for workers’ outcomes, for the following three reasons. First, our paper studies oc-
cupational decline that—while unanticipated early in workers’ careers—was nevertheless fairly
gradual. But if, for example, machine learning improves rapidly, occupational replacement may
happen faster, and may be accompanied by an overall worsening of employment opportunities
(Bostrom, 2014). Second, the occupational decline that we study largely spared the most skilled
occupations, but this may change with new technologies. Many professionals made sizeable in-
vestments in skills that are particularly useful in their occupations, and some may also benefit
from economic rents. It is possible that for these workers the earnings losses from future occu-
pational decline may be higher than those we estimate. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
our findings show that low-earning individuals are already suffering considerable (pre-tax) earn-
ings losses, even in Sweden, where institutions are geared towards mitigating those losses and
facilitating occupational transitions. Helping these workers stay productive when they face oc-
cupational decline remains an important challenge for governments.
References
ACEMOGLU, D., AND P. RESTREPO (2019): “Automation and New Tasks: How Technology Displaces and
Reinstates Labor,” Working Paper 25684, National Bureau of Economic Research.
ADERMON, A., AND M. GUSTAVSSON (2015): “Job Polarization and Task-Biased Technological Change: Evi-
dence from Sweden, 1975-2005,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 117(3), 878–917.
ANDERSSON, J. (2017): “Insurances against job loss and disability: Private and public interventions and their
effects on job search and labor supply,” Ph.D. thesis, Uppsala University.
ARNTZ, M., T. GREGORY, AND U. ZIERAHN (2017): “Revisiting the risk of automation,” Economics Letters,
159, 157 – 160.
AUTOR, D., AND D. DORN (2009): “This Job Is ”Getting Old”: Measuring Changes in Job Opportunities Using
Occupational Age Structure,” American Economic Review, 99(2), 45–51.
36
AUTOR, D. H. (2015): “Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace Automation,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(3), 3–30.
AUTOR, D. H., D. DORN, G. H. HANSON, AND J. SONG (2014): “Trade Adjustment: Worker-Level Evidence,”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(4), 1799–1860.
BANA, S. H. (2019): “Identifying Vulnerable DisplacedWorkers:The Role of State-Level Occupation Conditions,”
working paper.
BESSEN, J. (2016): “How computer automation affects occupations: Technology, jobs, and skills,” Law and
economics research paper 15-49, Boston University School of Law.
BOSTROM, N. (2014): Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. Oxford University Press.
BRYNJOLFSSON, E., AND A. MCAFEE (2014): The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a
Time of Brilliant Technologies. W. W. Norton & Company.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (1986): Occupational Outlook Handbook, 1986-87 Edition: Bulletin of the
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, No. 2250. US Department of Labor.
(2018): Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2018-2019 Edition. Bernan Press.
CAMPBELL, P. (2018): “Trucks headed for a driverless future,” Financial Times, January 31.
CAPRETTINI, B., AND H.-J. VOTH (2017): “Rage Against the Machines: Labour-Saving Technology and Unrest
in England, 1830-32,” CEPR Discussion Papers DP11800, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
CASELLI, F., AND A. MANNING (2018): “Robot arithmetic: new technology and wages,” American Economic
Review: Insights.
CORTES, G. M. (2016): “Where Have the Middle-Wage Workers Gone? A Study of Polarization Using Panel
Data,” Journal of Labor Economics, 34(1), 63–105.
CORTES, G. M., AND G. GALLIPOLI (2017): “The costs of occupational mobility: An aggregate analysis,”
Journal of the European Economic Association, 16(2), 275–315.
DAL BO, E., F. FINAN, O. FOLKE, T. PERSSON, AND J. RICKNE (2019): “Economic Losers and Political
Winners: Sweden’s Radical Right,” working paper.
DAUTH, W., S. FINDEISEN, J. SUEDEKUM, AND N. WOESSNER (2018): “Adjusting to Robots: Worker-Level
Evidence,” Working Papers 13, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Insti-
tute.
37
DAVIS, S., AND T. VON WACHTER (2011): “Recessions and the Costs of Job Loss,” Brookings Papers on Eco-
nomic Activity, 42(2 (Fall)), 1–72.
EDIN, P.-A., AND B. HOLMLUND (1995): “The Swedish Wage Structure: The Rise and Fall of Solidarity Wage
Policy?,” in Differences and Changes in Wage Structures, NBER Chapters, pp. 307–344. National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc.
ELIASON, M., AND D. STORRIE (2006): “Lasting or Latent Scars? Swedish Evidence on the Long-Term Effects
of Job Displacement,” Journal of Labor Economics, 24(4), 831–856.
FREY, C. B., AND M. A. OSBORNE (2017): “The future of employment: How susceptible are jobs to computer-
isation?,” Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 114, 254 – 280.
GALAASEN, S. M., AND A. R. KOSTØL (2018): “Mismatch and the Consequences of Job Loss,” working paper.
GATHMANN, C., I. HELM, AND U. SCHO¨NBERG (2018): “Spillover effects in local labor markets: Evidence
from mass layoffs,” Journal of the European Economic Association.
GATHMANN, C., AND U. SCHO¨NBERG (2010): “How general is human capital? A task-based approach,” Journal
of Labor Economics, 28(1), 1–49.
GOLDIN, C. (2000): “Labor Markets in the Twentieth Century,” in The Cambridge History of the United States,
ed. by R. E. G. Stanley L. Engerman, vol. 3, pp. 549–624. Cambridge University Press.
GOOS, M., A. MANNING, AND A. SALOMONS (2014): “Explaining Job Polarization: Routine-Biased Techno-
logical Change and Offshoring,” American Economic Review, 104(8), 2509–26.
GOTTFRIES, N. (2018): “The labor market in Sweden since the 1990s,” IZA World of Labor, pp. 411–411.
JACOBSON, L. S., R. J. LALONDE, AND D. G. SULLIVAN (1993): “Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers,”
The American Economic Review, 83(4), 685–709.
KAMBOUROV, G., AND I. MANOVSKII (2009): “Occupational specificity of human capital,” International Eco-
nomic Review, 50(1), 63–115.
LINDBECK, A. (1997): “The Swedish Experiment,” Journal of Economic Literature, 35(3), 1273–1319.
LINDQVIST, E., AND R. VESTMAN (2011): “The Labor Market Returns to Cognitive and Noncognitive Ability:
Evidence from the Swedish Enlistment,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3(1), 101–128.
MARX, K. (1867): Das Kapital. Verlag von Otto Meisner.
38
NEAL, D. (1995): “Industry-Specific Human Capital: Evidence from Displaced Workers,” Journal of labor Eco-
nomics, 13(4), 653–677.
OECD (2015): “Back to Work: Sweden,” Discussion paper.
PARENT, D. (2000): “Industry-Specific Capital and the Wage Profile: Evidence from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics,” Journal of Labor Economics, 18(2), 306–323.
PAVAN, R. (2011): “Career Choice and Wage Growth.,” Journal of Labor Economics, 29(3), 549–587.
PISSARIDES, C. A. (2000): Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd Edition. The MIT Press.
POLETAEV, M., AND C. ROBINSON (2008): “Human capital specificity: evidence from the Dictionary of Occu-
pational Titles and Displaced Worker Surveys, 1984–2000,” Journal of Labor Economics, 26(3), 387–420.
ROY, A. D. (1951): “Some Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings,” Oxford Economic Papers, 3(2), 135–146.
SCHEIBER, N. (2018): “High-Skilled White-Collar Work? Machines Can Do That, Too,” New York Times, July
07.
SCHMILLEN, A. (2018): “Vocational education, occupational choice and unemployment over the professional
career,” Empirical Economics.
SKANS, O. N., P.-A. EDIN, AND B. HOLMLUND (2009): “Wage dispersion between and within plants: Sweden
1985-2000,” in The structure of wages: An international comparison, pp. 217–260. University of Chicago Press.
SPITZ-OENER, A. (2006): “Technical change, job tasks, and rising educational demands: Looking outside the
wage structure,” Journal of Labor Economics, 24(2), 235–270.
SULLIVAN, P. (2010): “Empirical Evidence on Occupation and Industry Specific Human Capital,” Labour Eco-
nomics, 17(3), 567–580.
SUSSKIND, R. E., AND D. SUSSKIND (2015): The Future of the Professions: How Technology Will Transform
the Work of Human Experts. Oxford University Press.
VENERI, C. M. (1997): “Evaluating the 1995 occupational employment projections,” Monthly Labor Review, 120.
VIKSTRO¨M, J., AND G. VAN DEN BERG (2017): “La˚ngsiktiga effekter av arbetsmarknadsutbildning,” Discussion
Paper Rapport 2017:17.
39
(a) No switching cost
0 d
k i1
=
A,
k i2
=
B
ki1 = ki2 = B
ki1 = ki2 = A
αiA
α
iB
(b) Constant switching cost c (b’) Displacement (constant cost)
0 d− c
k i1
=
A,
k i2
=
B
ki1 = ki2 = B
ki1 = ki2 = A
αiA
α
iB
k i1
=
A,
k i2
=
B
k i1
=A
,k i2
=B
if
di
sp
lac
ed
;
ot
he
rw
ise
k i1
=k
i2
=A
ki1 = ki2 = B
ki1 = ki2 = A
0 d− c d− (c− ĉ)
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Notes: kit denotes the occupation chosen by worker i in period t. αik denotes log productivity of
worker i in occupation k. d is the amount by which the relative occupational log price declines from
period 1 to period 2. The parameter values chosen are (α,d,c, ĉ,C) = (1,0.5,0.25,0.25,1).
Figure 1: Sorting in a two-period Roy model
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Figure 2: Differences in earnings and cumulative earnings by exposure to occupational decline, over time
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Table 1: Quantifying workers’ exposure to occupational decline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Workers aged 16-64 in 1985 (3,061,051 observations)
Declining -0.49 -0.44 -0.43 -0.31 -0.28 -0.22
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
B. Workers aged 25-36 in 1985 (877,324 observations)
Declining -0.47 -0.40 -0.39 -0.28 -0.27 -0.22
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10)
Demographics & earnings X X X X X
Life-cycle profiles X X X X
Predictors of growth X X X
Occupation dummies X X
Industry dummies X
Notes: Results from regressions of occupational log employment changes on a dummy for working in a declining occupation are shown. Regressions are run on
individual-level data. However, the dependent variable is the difference in aggregate log employment in Swedish 3-digit occupations between 2013 and 1985, matched
to each workers’ 1985 5-digit occupation using a cross-walk. A Swedish 5-digit occupation is classified as ‘Declining’ if there are employment losses of more than 25
percent between 1986-2016 in the corresponding US occupation(s). In the regressions reported here, the ‘Declining’ variable indicates that an individual worked in such
an occupation in 1985. Demographic controls include female, cohort, county, and education dummies. Occupation-level life-cycle profiles are cumulative earnings cal-
culated for each individual based on their 1985 occupation. Predictors of growth include 1985 employment shares, 1960-85 occupational employment growth, and the
predicted growth index. Occupation and industry dummies are at the 1-digit and 2-digit levels, respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered by 1985 3-digit occupation,
in parentheses.
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Table 2: Baseline characteristics of workers in subsequently declining occupations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female Age Compulsory school High school College Earnings Manufacturing
A. Workers aged 16-64
Intercept 0.52 39.5 0.33 0.56 0.11 191.3 0.25
(0.078) (0.41) (0.030) (0.033) (0.027) (10.8) (0.050)
Declining -0.25 -0.89 0.13 -0.063 -0.070 -0.23 0.38
(0.088) (0.63) (0.035) (0.034) (0.028) (11.0) (0.085)
B. Workers aged 25-36
Intercept 0.51 30.8 0.23 0.64 0.13 182.8 0.23
(0.078) (0.078) (0.022) (0.033) (0.032) (9.28) (0.050)
Declining -0.26 -0.19 0.15 -0.065 -0.082 12.0 0.38
(0.085) (0.091) (0.030) (0.034) (0.034) (9.40) (0.084)
Notes: Results from OLS regressions of various baseline (1985) characteristics on a constant and an indicator for working in a declining occupation are shown (see the
notes to Table 1 for the definition of the declining indicator). Earnings are measured in thousand Swedish crowns inflated to 2014 levels. The sample includes all indi-
viduals of the indicated ages who were employed and earned at least the base amount in 1985, and whose education, occupation, and industry are observed. The number
of observations is 3,061,051 in panel A and 877,324 in panel B. Robust standard errors, clustered by 1985 3-digit occupation, in parentheses.
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Table 3: Balance of pre-determined characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Military test scores
Cognitive skills Non-cognitive skills
Declining -0.24 -0.015 0.022 -0.20 -0.077 -0.022
(0.084) (0.035) (0.022) (0.062) (0.041) (0.021)
Individual controls X X X X
Occ. & industry controls X X
Mean of dep. var. 0.06 0.06
Observations 272,350
B. Mother’s characteristics
Mother finished high school Mother’s earnings (1985)
Declining -0.059 -0.012 0.0033 -6.73 -2.31 0.079
(0.020) (0.0100) (0.0058) (2.41) (1.29) (0.84)
Individual controls X X X X
Occ. & industry controls X X
Mean of dep. var. 0.35 97.4
Observations 609,075
C. Father’s characteristics
Father finished high school Father’s earnings (1985)
Declining -0.069 -0.0088 0.0075 -13.7 -1.38 2.26
(0.027) (0.012) (0.0067) (6.67) (2.85) (1.99)
Individual controls X X X X
Occ. & industry controls X X
Mean of dep. var. 0.43 174.2
Observations 451,301
Notes: Results from regressions of various pre-determined characteristics on a dummy for working in 1985
in a subsequently declining occupation are shown. Test scores from the military enlistment are standardized
to have mean zero and unit variance within enlistment cohorts. The sample in panel A includes men born in
Sweden from 1952-1959 with non-missing test scores (more than 85 percent of men in each cohort), who were
employed and earned at least the base amount in 1985, and whose education, occupation, and industry are ob-
served. The samples in panels B and C are the same as that in panel B of Table 2, except that individuals with
missing information on mother’s or father’s education and income were dropped. Individual-level controls in-
clude female, cohort, county, and education dummies, as well as earnings in 1985. Occupation and industry
controls include predicted life-time income, predictors of occupational growth, occupation dummies, and in-
dustry dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered by 1985 3-digit occupation, in parentheses.
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Table 4: Occupational decline and individual-level cumulative employment and earnings 1986-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Cumulative years employed 1986-2013 (mean: 23.4)
Declining -0.73 -0.49 -0.49 -0.30 -0.24 -0.19
(0.26) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.18) (0.14)
B. Cumulative real earnings (’000 2014 SEK) 1986-2013 (mean: 6,926)
Declining -354 -347 -241 -117 -63 -126
(419) (120) (81) (76) (71) (58)
C. Cumulative real earnings divided by predicted initial earnings (mean: 38.7)
Declining -4.29 -2.10 -2.21 -1.52 -0.98 -1.11
(0.91) (0.53) (0.54) (0.54) (0.41) (0.36)
Demographics & earnings X X X X X
Life-cycle profiles X X X X
Predictors of growth X X X
Occupation dummies X X
Industry dummies X
Notes: Results from regressions of the indicated outcomes on a dummy for working in 1985 in a subsequently declining occupation are shown. Demographic controls
include female, cohort, county, and education dummies. Occupation-level life-cycle profiles are cumulative earnings calculated for each individual based on their 1985
occupation. Predictors of growth include 1985 employment shares, 1960-85 occupational employment growth, and the predicted growth index. Occupation and industry
dummies are at the 1-digit and 2-digit levels, respectively. The number of observations is 877,324. The sample is the same as that in panel B of Table 2. Robust standard
errors, clustered by 1985 3-digit occupation, in parentheses.
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Table 5: Occupational decline and individual occupational stability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Probability of working in same 3-digit occupation in 2013 as in 1985 (mean: 0.29)
Declining -0.14 -0.11 -0.11 -0.065 -0.086 -0.045
(0.043) (0.041) (0.042) (0.032) (0.035) (0.020)
B. Probability of working in same 2-digit occupation in 2013 as in 1985 (mean: 0.35)
Declining -0.12 -0.088 -0.087 -0.051 -0.070 -0.037
(0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.030) (0.030) (0.019)
C. Probability of working in same 1-digit occupation in 2013 as in 1985 (mean: 0.40)
Declining -0.098 -0.070 -0.069 -0.039 -0.060 -0.031
(0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.029) (0.027) (0.018)
Demographics & earnings X X X X X
Life-cycle profiles X X X X
Predictors of growth X X X
Occupation dummies X X
Industry dummies X
Notes: Results from regressions of the indicated outcomes on a dummy for working in 1985 in a subsequently declining occupation are shown. See the notes to Tables
1 and 4 for the definition of the declining indicator and a description of control variables, respectively. The number of observations is 553,169. The sample is the same
as that in panel B of Table 2, except that individuals who were employed in 2013 but not sampled in the Wage Structure Statistics had to be excluded, as it is unknown
whether they work in the same occupation in 2013 as in 1985. Sampling weights are applied. Robust standard errors, clustered by 1985 3-digit occupation, in parentheses.
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Table 6: Heterogeneity by within-occupation earnings rank
Employment Earnings Earnings, normalized Remain
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Linear interaction
Declining -0.51 -0.23 -353.5 -131.0 -2.16 -1.19 -0.11 -0.045
(0.21) (0.15) (110.7) (55.8) (0.55) (0.37) (0.041) (0.020)
Declining × rank 1.17 1.17 441.5 449.2 2.63 2.63 -0.011 -0.0010
(0.34) (0.30) (142.3) (146.8) (0.58) (0.57) (0.023) (0.017)
B. Dummy interactions
Declining -0.32 -0.031 -323.2 -98.0 -1.94 -0.97 -0.083 -0.022
(0.24) (0.18) (123.8) (66.7) (0.54) (0.41) (0.045) (0.021)
Declining × bottom tercile -1.12 -1.13 -341.8 -350.1 -2.10 -2.06 -0.046 -0.040
(0.35) (0.33) (106.7) (101.5) (0.54) (0.51) (0.014) (0.013)
Declining × top tercile 0.54 0.55 232.3 235.1 1.37 1.40 -0.047 -0.030
(0.20) (0.16) (135.8) (132.1) (0.43) (0.48) (0.027) (0.018)
Individual controls X X X X X X X X
Occupation & industry controls X X X X
Mean of dep. var. 23.4 6,926 38.7 0.29
Mean of dep. var., bottom 22.3 6,001 35.6 0.27
Observations 877,324 553,786
Notes: Results from regressions of the indicated outcomes on the declining indicator, within-occupation earnings rank or tercile dummies (coefficients omitted from ta-
ble), and their interactions are shown. Within-occupation earnings ranks are computed in 1985 and re-scaled so as to range from −1 to 1. In panel A, the main effect
on the declining indicator thus applies to the individual earning the median income within her occupation, and the coefficient on the interaction gives the inter-quartile
range. Individual-level controls include female, cohort, county, and education dummies, as well as earnings in 1985. Occupation and industry controls include predicted
life-time income, predictors of occupational growth, occupation dummies, and industry dummies. Normalized earnings are cumulative earnings divided by initial pre-
dicted earnings. The sample for columns (1)-(6) is the same as that in Table 4, and for columns (7)-(8) it is the same as that in Table 5. Robust standard errors, clustered
by 1985 3-digit occupation, in parentheses.
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Table 7: Occupational decline and the incidence of unemployment and retraining
Ever Cumulative days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Unemployment
Declining 0.041 0.013 0.015 0.019 52.4 17.9 20.8 20.5
(0.021) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (24.8) (14.0) (14.0) (18.2)
Declining × rank -0.036 -63.8
(0.012) (21.5)
Declining × bottom tercile 0.017 42.4
(0.012) (18.3)
Declining × top tercile -0.033 -43.7
(0.012) (17.0)
Mean of dep. var. 0.39 262
Mean of dep. var., bottom 0.43 317
B. Retraining
Declining 0.035 0.012 0.013 0.015 11.4 4.73 5.04 5.81
(0.010) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0081) (2.68) (1.46) (1.48) (2.26)
Declining × rank -0.027 -8.63
(0.0070) (1.98)
Declining × bottom tercile 0.014 4.38
(0.0072) (2.28)
Declining × top tercile -0.022 -6.96
(0.0064) (2.12)
Mean of dep. var. 0.13 29
Mean of dep. var., bottom 0.15 35
Individual controls X X X X X X X X
Occupation & industry controls X X X X X X
Notes: Results from regressions of the indicated outcomes on the declining indicator, within-occupation earnings rank or tercile dummies (coefficients omitted from ta-
ble), and their interactions are shown. Incidence of unemployment and retraining are measured during the period 1992-2013. The sample is the same as that in panel B
of Table 2. See the notes to Table 6 for a description of right-hand side variables. Robust standard errors, clustered by 1985 3-digit occupation, in parentheses.
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Table 8: Occupational decline and older workers
Cumulative years employed Cumulative earnings Age at retirement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A. Workers aged 37-48 in 1985 (976,637 observations)
Declining -0.70 -0.32 -0.47 -273.1 -72.9 -99.4 -0.39 -0.15 -0.25
(0.16) (0.11) (0.12) (53.0) (43.4) (39.7) (0.097) (0.065) (0.074)
Declining × rank 0.98 173.6 0.65
(0.25) (85.8) (0.18)
Mean of dependent variable 17.2 4,759 62.8
B. Workers aged 49-60 in 1985 (650,538 observations)
Declining -0.29 -0.047 -0.087 -75.0 12.3 8.09 -0.19 -0.011 -0.038
(0.085) (0.070) (0.072) (18.2) (18.8) (18.2) (0.062) (0.048) (0.049)
Declining × rank 0.18 14.4 0.13
(0.093) (26.4) (0.072)
Mean of dependent variable 7.0 1,576 63.6
Individual controls X X X X X X X X X
Occupation & industry controls X X X X X X
Notes: Results from regressions of the indicated outcomes on the declining indicator, within-occupation earnings rank (coefficient omitted from table), and their inter-
action are shown. Retirement is defined as the beginning of a continuous spell of years with zero earnings lasting until age 65. Samples are as in panel A of Table 2,
but restricted by age as indicated. See the notes to Table 6 for a description of right-hand side variables. Robust standard errors, clustered by 1985 3-digit occupation, in
parentheses.
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A Theory appendix
Here we provide a self-contained exposition of the theoretical model discussed in Section 2 of the paper,
including all formal derivations. We consider two occupations, one of which is hit by a negative demand
shock. We investigate how workers’ likelihood of leaving the affected occupation, and their earnings
losses, depend on their initial earnings. Starting from a standard frictionless Roy (1951) model, we
successively introduce positive and potentially heterogeneous costs of switching occupation; as well as
the possibility that workers are displaced from their jobs and incur a cost to find a new job even when
remaining in their initial occupation. Finally, we consider how workers’ sorting differs when the negative
demand shock is anticipated.
A.1 Setting
We consider a competitive economy with a continuum of individuals indexed by i who live for two
periods t ∈ {1,2} and each supplies a unit of labor inelastically each period. There are two occupations
indexed by k ∈ {A,B} for the workers to choose from. Workers’ per-period log earnings are given
by yikt = pikt +αik− cikt where pikt is the time-varying and stochastic (log) price of a unit of output in
occupation k, αik is the time-invariant (log) amount of output that worker i produces in occupation k, and
cikt ≥ 0 is a time cost related to occupational switching, which we discuss below.
1 There are no saving
opportunities and earnings are consumed immediately. We define the life-time expected utility function
as ❊[yik1+βyik2], where β > 0 is a discount factor. In each period, workers choose the occupation that
maximizes their expected utility. As a normalization, we assume that workers always choose occupation
A if indifferent. Since we focus our analysis on relative wages, we define pit ≡ piBt − piAt and assume
for simplicity that pi1 = 0.
2 Prices are determined in equilibrium by supply and demand. However,
here we take them as given, and analyze the consequences of a change to prices occurring in period
2 for occupational sorting and earnings. Note that the second period may be interpreted as all periods
following this change, so β could be larger than one. For simplicity, we assume that αiA and αiB are
independent and both uniformly distributed between zero and some finite but possibly large number
α . We explain in the following subsections that our main results are robust to alternative distributional
assumptions.
In period 2, there is a negative demand shock to occupation A such that piA2−piA1 = −d and pi2 =
d,d > 0. This may be due to labor-replacing technology becoming available, or cheaper, in occupation A.
We are interested in the consequences of the shock for the earnings of workers who start out in occupation
A, under various assumptions about switching costs and anticipation of the price change. Formally, let
li ≡❊[yi2|αiA,ki1 = A,DA = 0]−❊[yi2|αiA,ki1 = A,DA = 1] be the expected earnings loss in period 2 that
results from the shock, conditional on worker i starting out in occupation A, and conditional on her ability
(and hence earnings rank) αiA, where the occurrence of the shock is indicated by DA ∈ {0,1}. Similarly,
lswitchi and l
stay
i denote the earnings losses further conditioned on leaving and staying, respectively, and pi
1The time cost may reflect search or retraining (or both); we assume throughout that a worker’s wage equals the value of
her marginal product, epikt+αik . We thus abstract from any job-level rents that may arise in the presence of search frictions.
2We do not claim to identify any aggregate gains from technological change, and we do not model them here.
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is the probability of switching.3 The overall loss is given by
li = l
stay
i − pi
(
l
stay
i − l
switch
i
)
. (OA1)
As long as there is no displacement then l
stay
i = d and by revealed preference l
switch
i ≤ d, so that li ≤ d.
Thus, switching enables workers to mitigate the losses from occupational decline. In the following
subsections we verify that, in each version of our model, ∂ pi∂d ≥ 0,
∂ li
∂d ≥ 0 (with strict inequalities for
some i): the larger the drop in demand, the more workers switch, and the higher are earnings losses.
Furthermore, ∂ li∂αiA =−
∂ pi
∂αiA
(
l
stay
i − l
switch
i
)
+ pi
∂ lswitchi
∂αiA
. In other words, losses decrease with initial within-
occupation earnings rank if the switching probability is increasing and the loss of switchers decreasing
in initial earnings rank, ∂ pi∂αiA > 0 and
∂ lswitchi
∂αiA
< 0.
In what follows, we investigate how mean earnings losses vary with αiA, and hence with initial
earnings, under various assumptions about switching costs and anticipation of the price change. To char-
acterize switching behavior and earnings losses, we require a distributional assumption. For simplicity,
we henceforth assume that αiA and αiB are independent and both uniformly distributed between zero
and some finite but possibly large number α . We argue below that our results are robust to alternative
distributional assumptions.
A.2 Baseline model
We start with the simplest case, where occupational prices pikt are revealed at the start of each period
and there are no switching costs. Hence, occupational choice is a sequence of static decisions that can
be analyzed in isolation. The set of workers choosing occupation A in period 1 is characterized by the
inequality αiB ≤ αiA, and it lies on and below the main diagonal in panel (a) of Figure OA1 (blue and
red areas). The workers who switch in the second period must satisfy the inequalities αiB ≤ αiA and
αiB > αiA−d, indicated by the blue area in panel (a) of Figure OA1.
To characterize switching probabilities and earnings losses, we need to distinguish two cases. Among
workers in occupation A with αiA ≤ d, everyone switches and their period-2 log earnings, given unifor-
mity, are on average αiA/2, which is also the earnings loss they suffer. For those with αiA > d, the
probability of switching is d/αiA. The switchers’ log productivity in occupation B lies between αiA−d
and αiA, so given uniformity their period-2 log earnings are on average αiA− d/2, so that they suffer a
loss of d/2. Switching probabilities, and their derivatives with respect to initial skill, are thus
pi =


1 if αiA ≤ d
d
αiA
if αiA > d,
∂ pi
∂αiA
=


0 if αiA ≤ d
− d
α2iA
< 0 if αiA > d,
3Formally,
li ≡ li(αiA,d) ≡ ❊[yi2|αiA,ki1 = A,DA = 0]−❊[yi2|αiA,ki1 = A,DA = 1],
lswitchi ≡ l
switch
i (αiA,d) ≡ ❊[yi2|αiA,ki1 = A,DA = 0]−❊[yi2|αiA,ki1 = A,ki2 = B,DA = 1],
l
stay
i ≡ l
stay
i (αiA,d) ≡ ❊[yi2|αiA,ki1 = A,DA = 0]−❊[yi2|αiA,ki1 = A,ki2 = A,DA = 1],
pi ≡ pi(αiA,d) ≡ P(ki2 = B|ki1 = A,αiA,DA = 1).
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Notes: kit denotes the occupation chosen by worker i in period t. αik denotes log productivity of worker i in
occupation k. d is the amount by which the relative occupational log price declines from period 1 to period
2. The parameter values chosen are (α,d,c, ĉ,C) = (1,0.5,0.25,0.25,1).
Figure OA1: Sorting in a two-period Roy model
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and earnings losses are
li =


αiA
2 if αiA ≤ d
d
(
1−
d
2αiA
)
if αiA > d,
∂ li
∂αiA
=


1
2 > 0 if αiA ≤ d
d2
2α2iA
> 0 if αiA > d.
Given the above expressions, it is also straightforward to verify that ∂ pi/∂d ≥ 0 and ∂ li/∂d ≥ 0. We
summarize our analytical results for the baseline model as follows.
Result 1 The fraction who switch among those initially working in A is weakly decreasing in αiA. More-
over, switchers’ earnings losses are also weakly increasing in αiA; and taken together, mean earnings
losses for workers starting out in occupation A are strictly increasing in αiA, and hence initial occupa-
tional earnings.
To understand the intuition for these results, call occupation A “typist” and occupation B “cashier”,
where typists suffer a negative demand shock. The worst typists could only become the worst cashiers,
otherwise they would have chosen to be cashiers in period 1. But the best typists can at most become
the best cashiers, and in general they will not all be the best cashiers. Therefore, the best typists are less
able to mitigate their earnings losses by becoming cashiers, and they suffer larger losses than the worst
typists.
This argument suggests that switching probabilities are decreasing and earnings losses are increasing
in ability under a large set of alternative assumptions on the skill distributions. A sufficient condition for
earnings losses to be higher for the most able than for the least able is that there is finite support with
positive probability mass for all (αiA,αiB) ∈ [0,α]× [0,α].
A.3 Costs of switching between occupations
We continue to assume that the period-2 price change is unanticipated, but now we assume that there are
costs of switching occupations. We think of these costs as the time lost searching for a new job or spent
in retraining, and model them as additive in log terms. We start with the simple case where the time
cost is constant across workers (and thus proportional to earnings), and then consider a case where it is
decreasing in workers’ ability in the destination occupation B.
A.3.1 Constant switching costs
Take first the case where the switching cost for moving from occupation A to B is a constant c ∈ (0,d);
the case c ≥ d is uninteresting since nobody would switch in response to the adverse shock, so we only
consider the case c< d. Occupational choice is no longer a period-by-period decision. Instead, workers
choose in period 1 the occupation with the highest expected present discounted value of log earnings, net
of switching costs. Let us assume that occupational log prices follow a random walk, ❊[pi2] = pi1 = 0,
where the last equality is due to our earlier simplifying assumption.4
4Instead of the random walk assumption we could impose that demand changes are somehow otherwise perfectly unfore-
seen, for instance due to adaptive expectations (in Section A.5 we consider the case where demand changes are anticipated).
6
If choosing occupation A, expected life-time utility isViA =αiA+β❊[max{piA2+αiA,piB2+αiB−c}].
If choosing occupation B, it is ViB = αiB + β❊[max{piA2 + αiA,piB2 + αiB}]. Consider the following
exhaustive list of possible cases:
• If αiA ≥ αiB, then ❊[max{piA2+αiA,piB2+αiB− c}] =❊[max{piA2+αiA,piB2+αiB}] =❊[piA2]+αiA, and ViA ≥ViB.
• If αiB − c ≤ αiA < αiB, then ❊[max{piA2 + αiA,piB2 + αiB − c}] = ❊[piA2] + αiA, ❊[max{piA2 + αiA,piB2 + αiB}] =
❊[piB2]+αiB, and ViA <ViB.
• If αiA < αiB−c, then❊[max{piA2+αiA,piB2+αiB−c}] =❊[piB2]+αiB−c,❊[max{piA2+αiA,piB2+αiB}] =❊[piB2]+
αiB, and ViA <ViB.
This establishes that worker i chooses occupation A in period 1 if and only if αiA ≥ αiB. Decisions at
the beginning of the terminal period 2 are easily characterized, as before. After the price change, worker
i switches if and only if αiB− c > αiA− d. In sum, the workers who switch to occupation B after the
price change satisfy the inequalities αiB ≤ αiA and αiB > αiA− (d− c). Panel (b) of Figure OA1 shows
a situation that is qualitatively similar to the baseline model, except that the blue region marking the
workers who switch is smaller than in panel (a). Deriving expressions for the switching probability and
earnings loss as a function of initial earnings follows along very similar lines as in the proof of Result 1.
To characterize switching probabilities and earnings losses, we again to distinguish two cases. Among
workers in occupation A with αiA ≤ d− c, everyone switches and their period-2 log earnings, given uni-
formity, are on average αiA/2− c, which gives an average loss of αiA/2+ c. For those with αiA > d− c,
the probability of switching is (d−c)/αiA. The switchers’ log productivity in occupation B lies between
αiA− (d− c) and αiA, so given uniformity their period-2 log earnings are on average αiA− (d− c)/2, so
that they suffer a loss of (d+ c)/2. Switching probabilities, and their derivatives with respect to initial
skill, are thus
pi =


1 if αiA ≤ d− c
d−c
αiA
if αiA > d− c,
∂ pi
∂αiA
=


0 if αiA ≤ d− c
−d−c
α2iA
< 0 if αiA > d− c,
and earnings losses are
li =


αiA
2 + c if αiA ≤ d− c
d−
(d− c)2
2αiA
if αiA > d− c,
∂ li
∂αiA
=


1
2 > 0 if αiA ≤ d− c
(d− c)2
2α2iA
> 0 if αiA > d− c.
Given the above expressions, as in the baseline model, ∂ pi/∂d ≥ 0 and ∂ li/∂d ≥ 0. We summarize our
analytical results for the constant switching cost model as follows.
Result 2 Under a constant switching cost, we obtain the same qualitative conclusions as in Result 1:
The fraction who switch among those initially working in A is weakly decreasing in αiA. Moreover,
switchers’ earnings losses are also weakly increasing in αiA; and taken together, mean earnings losses
for workers starting out in occupation A are strictly increasing in αiA, and hence initial occupational
earnings.
The same intuition as in the baseline model of Section A.2 applies: the best workers in the declining
occupation are less likely to be able to mitigate their earnings losses by switching occupation.
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A.3.2 Heterogenous switching costs
Suppose instead that workers who wish to switch from A to Bmust pay a switching cost equal toC−αiB,
with C > α (the condition C > α ensures that all workers face a strictly positive switching cost). This
structure of switching costs captures in a reduced form way the frictions that occupational moves may
entail: for example, job search may take time, and those more able in the new occupation may find a job
more quickly.
We continue to assume that occupational log prices follow a random walk. If choosing occupation
A, we have ViA = αiA + β❊[max{piA2 +αiA,piB2 +αiB− (C−αiB)}]. If choosing occupation B, then
ViB = αiB+β❊[max{piA2+αiA,piB2+αiB}]. Consider the following exhaustive list of possible cases.
• If αiA ≥ αiB, then ❊[max{piA2+αiA,piB2+αiB− (C−αiB)}] = ❊[max{piA2+αiA,piB2+αiB}] = ❊[piA2] +αiA, and
ViA ≥ViB.
• If αiB−(C−αiB)≤αiA <αiB, then❊[max{piA2+αiA,piB2+αiB−(C−αiB)}] =❊[piA2]+αiA,❊[max{piA2+αiA,piB2+
αiB}] =❊[piB2]+αiB, and ViA <ViB.
• If αiA < αiB− (C−αiB), then ❊[max{piA2+αiA,piB2+αiB− (C−αiB)}] = ❊[piB2]+αiB− (C−αiB), ❊[max{piA2+
αiA,piB2+αiB}] =❊[piB2]+αiB, and ViA <ViB.
This establishes again that worker i chooses occupation A in period 1 if and only if αiA ≥ αiB. After
the price change in period 2, worker i switches if and only if αiB− (C−αiB) > αiA− d. Thus, the
workers who switch to occupation B after the shock must now satisfy the inequalities αiB ≤ αiA and
αiB > αiA/2+ (C− d)/2, shown as the blue area in panel (c) of Figure OA1. The figure shows that
workers with αiA below C− d do not switch, and that above C− d, the fraction switching is increasing
in αiA due to uniformity. Thus,
pi =


0 if αiA <C−d
1
2 −
C−d
2αiA
if αiA ≥C−d,
∂ pi
∂αiA
=


0 if αiA <C−d
C−d
2α2iA
> 0 if αiA ≥C−d,
and
lswitchi =
d
2 +
C−αiA
2 ,
∂ lswitchi
∂αiA
=−12 < 0
where we used the fact that mean earnings of switchers equal 3αiA/2− (C+d)/2. Thus, if αiA >C−d,
we have by (OA1) that ∂ li/∂αiA < 0 (and zero otherwise). It is also straightforward to verify that
∂ pi/∂d ≥ 0,∂ li/∂d > 0. To summarize:
Result 3 If the cost of switching occupations is decreasing in αiA, then the fraction who switch among
those initially working in A is weakly increasing in αiA, and mean losses conditional on αiA are (weakly)
decreasing in αiA, and hence initial earnings.
In terms of the example above, in this case the worst typists do not switch, because their initial choice
of occupation A reveals not only low earnings potential in occupation B but also a large switching cost.
Among the best typists, however, many possess substantial earnings potential as cashiers, as well as low
switching costs. Therefore, the best typists are on average better able to mitigate their earnings losses by
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becoming cashiers, and hence the earnings losses from the demand shock are smaller for the best typists
than for the worst typists.5
A.4 Job displacement
So far, we have been concerned with earnings losses as a function of initial earnings in the context of
a Roy model where any moves between occupations are voluntary. By revealed preference, losses of
movers must be less than those of stayers. Here we show that introducing job displacement and a cost of
finding a new job in the initial occupation may overturn this result.6
Suppose that workers who start in occupation A experience job displacement with probability λ at
the end of period 1. For simplicity, and to maximize similarity with previous cases, we assume that
displacement catches workers by surprise: ex-ante, they believe the probability of displacement equals
zero. We have verified that our results are qualitatively unchanged when we assume that workers know
the true probability before choosing an occupation in period 1.
A.4.1 Displacement under constant switching costs
Displacement affects choices only in the presence of switching costs. First we assume that displaced
workers incur a cost ĉ > 0 to find a job in A, and a cost c to find a job in B (the latter of course also
applies to non-displaced workers). Here we have in mind exogenous job losses, for instance due to plant
closure, which are a standard feature of search models (see for instance Pissarides, 2000).
The workers who are displaced switch occupation if and only if αiB > αiA−(d−(c− ĉ)), and among
them are individuals who would remain if not displaced, αiB ≤ αiA− (d− c). Workers not suffering
displacement switch voluntarily if and only if αiB > αiA− (d− c). Thus, there is a set of workers who
switch occupation only if suffering displacement, as illustrated by the yellow area in panel (b’) of Figure
1. Given uniformity, we have switching probabilities
pi =


1 if αiA ≤ d− c
λ +(1−λ ) d−cαiA if d− c< αiA < d− (c− ĉ)
d−c
αiA
+λ ĉαiA if αiA ≥ d− (c− ĉ),
∂ pi
∂αiA
=


0 if αiA ≤ d− c
−(1−λ ) d−c
α2iA
< 0 if d− c< αiA < d− (c− ĉ)
− d−c
α2iA
−λ ĉ
α2iA
< 0 if αiA ≥ d− (c− ĉ).
The earnings loss in the first region is the same as in the case without displacement in Section A.3.1.
The calculations are more involved in the second and third regions. Let ρbluei denote the probability
that a worker’s skill αiB lies in the blue region in panel (b’) of Figure OA1 (conditional on starting
out in occupation A and on αiA), let l
blue
i be her expected loss, and analogously define ρ
yellow
i ,ρ
red
i and
5While our model excludes occupation-specific human capital, it does allow us to think about some of its potential impli-
cations. For example, if all workers accumulate occupation-specific human capital additively (in logarithms) the effects are
similar to adding constant switching costs, since switching means foregoing this capital. And if higher ability workers accumu-
late more occupation-specific human capital they become less occupationally mobile, in contrast to the case of heterogenous
switching costs discussed above.
6Recall that a large literature has documented substantial earnings losses due to job displacement (see for instance Jacobson,
LaLonde, and Sullivan, 1993) and even larger losses if such displacement coincides with switching occupation (Kambourov
and Manovskii, 2009).
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l
yellow
i , l
red
i . When d− c< αiA < d− (c− ĉ), we have
(
ρ
yellow
i ,ρ
blue
i
)
=
(
1−
d− c
αiA
,
d− c
αiA
)
,
(
l
yellow
i , l
blue
i
)
=
(
λ
(
αiA
2
+
d+ c
2
)
+(1−λ )d,
d+ c
2
)
and
li = l
blue
i +ρ
yellow
i
(
l
yellow
i − l
blue
i
)
,
where we note that l
yellow
i − l
blue
i = λ
αiA
2 +(1−λ )
d−c
2 > 0.
When αiA ≥ d− (c− ĉ), we additionally define ρ
red
i and l
red
i in the same sense as above, so we have
(
ρ redi ,ρ
yellow
i ,ρ
blue
i
)
=
(
1−
d− (c− ĉ)
αiA
,
ĉ
αiA
,
d− c
αiA
)
,
(
lredi , l
yellow
i , l
blue
i
)
=
(
λ (d+ ĉ)+(1−λ )d,d+
ĉ
2
,
d+ c
2
)
and
li = l
blue
i +ρ
red
i
(
lredi − l
blue
i
)
+ρ
yellow
i
(
l
yellow
i − l
blue
i
)
,
where lredi − l
blue
i =
d−c
2 +λ ĉ> 0 and l
yellow
i − l
blue
i =
d−c
2 +
ĉ
2 > 0. Thus,
li =


αiA
2 + c if αiA ≤ d− c
d+c
2 +
(
1− d−cαiA
)(
λ αiA2 +(1−λ )
d−c
2
)
if d− c< αiA < d− (c− ĉ)
d+λ ĉ− (d−(c−ĉ))(d−c+2λ ĉ)2αiA if αiA ≥ d− (c− ĉ),
and
∂ li
∂αiA
=


1
2 > 0 if αiA ≤ d− c
d−c
α2iA
(
l
yellow
i − l
blue
i
)
+ρ
yellow
i
λ
2 > 0 if d− c< αiA < d− (c− ĉ)
(d−(c−ĉ))(d−c+2λ ĉ)
2α2iA
> 0 if αiA ≥ d− (c− ĉ).
It is also straightforward to verify that ∂ pi/∂d ≥ 0 and ∂ li/∂d ≥ 0. To summarize:
Result 4 If the cost of switching occupations is constant, if workers in occupation A may be displaced
from their jobs, and if the cost of finding a new job in occupation A is also constant, then the fraction
who switch among those initially working in (weakly) decreasing in αiA, and mean losses conditional on
αiA are strictly increasing in αiA and hence initial earnings.
Displacement does not affect the qualitative results that we obtained before when assuming constant
switching costs (Section A.3.1). It is still the case that the most skilled among the workers starting out in
A are less likely to be in a position where they can mitigate their earnings losses by switching occupation.
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A.4.2 Displacement under heterogenous switching costs
In the case of a heterogeneous cost (C−αiB) of moving to occupation B, we introduce in symmetric
fashion a cost of finding a job in occupation A in case of displacement, C−αiA. Period-1 occupational
choices are the same as in the case of heterogenous switching costs without displacement, since we
assume that workers believe the displacement probability to be zero. Recall that workers not affected
by displacement switch voluntarily if and only if αiB > αiA/2+ (C− d)/2. Workers that do suffer
displacement switch occupation if and only if αiB > αiA− d/2, as illustrated by the yellow area in (c’)
of Figure 1. The figures suggests that, going from low to high values of αiA, the switching probability
first equals λ as all displaced workers switch and then falls below λ and becomes a decreasing function
of αiA, and possibly, eventually an increasing function of αiA, since the incidence of voluntary switching
increases in αiA for large values of αiA.
Indeed, switching probabilities are characterized as
pi =


λ if αiA ≤
d
2
λd
2αiA
if d2 < αiA <C−d
1−λ
2 −
(1−λ )C−d
2αiA
if αiA ≥C−d,
∂ pi
∂αiA
=


0 if αiA ≤
d
2
− λd
2α2iA
< 0 if d2 < αiA <C−d
(1−λ )C−d
2α2iA
T 0 ⇔ (1−λ )C T d if αiA ≥C−d.
The expression for the switching probability for αiA ≥C−d follows from the fact that when αiA ≥
C− d, the probability of a worker being in the blue region in panel (c’) of Figure OA1 equals 1/2−
(C− d)/(2αiA), and the probability of being in the yellow region is C/(2αiA)− 1/2. We see that for
αiA > C− d the switching probability is strictly increasing in αiA provided the shock is not too large,
d/C < 1−λ .
The losses from occupational decline in this version of the model are
li =


λC+(1−λ )d if αiA ≤
d
2
λ
[
C−αiA+d−
d2
4αiA
]
+(1−λ )d if d2 < αiA <C−d
ℓi if αiA ≥C−d,
where ℓi is to be characterized below. For αiA < d/2, workers move if and only if they are displaced,
and the expected loss of movers is constant at C, while the expected loss of stayers is constant at d.
Hence, the overall expected loss in this region equals λC+(1−λ )d and thus does not depend on αiA.
For αiA ∈ (d/2,C− d), the expected loss for those who are displaced and stay is C−αiA+ d and for
those who are displaced and move it isC−αiA+d/2 (all non-displaced workers stay). Together with the
switching probability, the result follows.
Finally, we consider the case αiA ≥ C− d. Let ρ
red
i denote the probability that a worker’s skill αiB
lies in the red region in panel (c’) of Figure OA1 (conditional on starting out in occupation A and on αiA),
let lredi be her expected loss, and analogously define ρ
yellow
i ,ρ
blue
i and l
yellow
i , l
blue
i . We have
ℓi = l
blue
i +ρ
red
i
(
lredi − l
blue
i
)
+ρ
yellow
i
(
l
yellow
i − l
blue
i
)
,
where
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(
ρ redi ,ρ
yellow
i
)
=
(
1−
d
2αiA
,
C−αiA
2αiA
)
,
(
lredi , l
yellow
i , l
blue
i
)
=
(
d+λ (C−αiA),d+λ
C−αiA
2
,
d
2
+
C−αiA
2
)
,
and so
ℓi = d+λ (C−αiA)+
1
2αiA
(
−
d2
2
+(1−λ )(C−αiA)
(
d−
C−αiA
2
))
and
∂ℓi
∂αiA
=
d2+C(C−2d)(1−λ )−α2iA(3λ +1)
4αiA
.
Thus,7
∂ li
∂αiA
=


0 if αiA ≤
d
2
λ
[
d2
4α2iA
−1
]
< 0 if d2 < αiA <C−d
∂ℓi/∂αiA < 0 ⇐
d
C
< 23 if αiA ≥C−d.
Let us assume that d/C < min{2/3,1−λ}. This is a sensible assumptions, as it implies that the shock
is not huge—it does not come close to making the declining occupation vanish (recall that C > α). This
also is the case that gives rise to the richest patterns of switching behavior, as for instance the yellow
region of panel (c’) of Figure OA1 would not coexist with the blue region if d/2 > C− d. As before,
∂ pi/∂d ≥ 0 and ∂ li/∂d ≥ 0. To summarize:
Result 5 If the cost of switching occupations is decreasing in initial earnings, if workers in occupation
A may be displaced from their jobs, and if the cost of finding a new job in occupation A is also decreasing
in initial earnings, then the fraction who switch among those initially working in A is U-shaped in αiA,
and mean losses conditional on αiA are (weakly) decreasing in αiA and hence initial earnings.
Intuitively, the earnings loss is decreasing in initial earnings, as in the case with heterogenous switch-
ing costs without displacement (Section A.3.2), because the costs of moving jobs—both within and
across occupations—decrease with initial earnings.
A.5 Revelation of period-2 prices at the start of period 1
As a final variation on our model, we consider a case where period-2 prices are revealed to be pi2 = d at
the start of period 1. Without switching costs, decisions are again static and occupational choices follow
the same conditions as in the baseline model of Section A.2. Suppose however that there is a constant
(across individuals) switching cost c ∈ (0,d) for moving from A to B, as in the first scenario considered
7The sign of ∂ℓi
∂αiA
is the same as the sign of its numerator. Since αiA >C−d when li = ℓi, the numerator is strictly less than
d2+C(C−2d)(1−λ )− (C−d)2(3λ +1) = λ
(
d2−4(C−d)2
)
which is negative if d/C < 2/3. The expression is also negative if d/C > 2, but cases with d >C are uninteresting since they
imply that everyone leaves the declining occupation.
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in Section A.3. Workers choose an occupational path by comparing the deterministic life-time utilities
associated with the choices (A,A), (A,B), and (B,B). Let switching costs again be constant. The life-
time utilities are given byViAA = αiA+β (αiA−d),ViAB = αiA+β (αiB−c), andViBB = αiB+βαiB. First,
let us assume that switching cots are not too large, (1+β )c< d. Then we have:
• If αiB ≤ αiA− (d− c), the worker chooses (A,A).
• If αiB > αiA− (d− c) and αiB ≤ αiA−βc, the worker chooses (A,B).
• If αiB > αiA−βc, the worker chooses (B,B).
All workers with αiB > αiA− βc choose occupation B in period 1 and remain there. Thus, some
workers who otherwise would have started out in occupation A instead start in B to avoid the switching
cost, and the fraction of workers switching in the period when the shock hits is smaller than without
anticipation of the shock.
If switching costs are large instead, (1+β )c≥ d, then workers with αiB≤αiA−βc choose (A,A) and
workers with αiB > αiA−βc choose (B,B), so that no switching occurs after period 1. To summarize:
Result 6 If period-2 prices are revealed already at the start of period 1, and under a constant occu-
pational switching cost, the fraction of workers starting out in occupation A, and the fraction of work-
ers leaving occupation A after the first period, are both smaller than in the case without anticipation
discussed in Section A.3.1. The fraction switching occupation after period 1 may even be zero if the
switching cost is large.
More generally, the model suggests that the set of workers who are in declining occupations may
differ for anticipated and unanticipated shocks. Different combinations of anticipation, general equilib-
rium responses, heterogeneity of occupational switching costs, and displacement, may lead to a range of
different outcomes.
A.6 Summary of theoretical results
We have modelled occupational decline using a Roy model, where employment in an occupation declines
as a result of a fall in occupational price caused by a technology shock. The model illustrates how
earnings losses due to occupational decline are mitigated by occupational switching.
Furthermore, our frictionless baseline model makes three predictions: the probability of leaving a
declining occupation is decreasing in initial earnings; earnings losses due to occupational decline are
increasing in initial earnings; and earnings losses of those who leave a declining occupation are less than
the losses of those who remain.
Anticipating that these predictions are inconsistent with our empirical findings, we have considered
several modifications to the model. Introducing an occupational switching cost that is decreasing in
the worker’s earnings in the destination occupation leads to a positive relationship between switching
probabilities and initial earnings, and a negative relationship between earnings losses and initial earn-
ings. Allowing for displacement, together with a cost of switching jobs within an occupation, implies
that switchers’ earnings losses may be larger than those of stayers. Moreover, displacement can cause
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switching probabilities to be U-shaped in initial earnings, whereby low-earning workers switch involun-
tarily if displaced, while high-earning workers switch voluntarily regardless of displacement.
The importance of switching costs in our theoretical analysis motivates our empirical approach of
focusing not only on losses in career earnings incurred by workers starting out in declining occupations,
but also on losses in years employed, as well as on the incidence of unemployment and retraining. While
our model does not include a non-work sector, it could be shown that a negative demand shock would
trigger moves from the affected occupation into non-participation.
Finally, we have used our model to show that much of re-sorting in response to a technology shock
may occur before the shock hits if it is anticipated in advance, motivating our investigation of both
anticipated and unanticipated occupational decline.
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B Data appendix
B.1 Data sources
Our main analysis is based on individual-level longitudinal administrative data covering the entire pop-
ulation of Sweden 1985-2013, and on various editions of the Occupational Outlook Handbook (OOH)
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in the US. Part of our analysis also uses data from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) containing a sample of US residents, as well as a
number of auxiliary data sources, as described below.
B.1.1 Occupation data
Our primary source for measuring occupational decline are the 1986-87 and the 2018-19 editions of
the Occupational Outlook Handbook (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1986, 2018d). The OOH contains a
description of the nature of work, the current number of jobs, and projected employment growth for hun-
dreds of occupations. For a subset of these occupations, more detailed information is reported, including
required qualifications, pay, and the role of technology: whether technology is expected to affect—or has
already affected—the occupation in question, and if so, what the impact on employment will be or has
been. In the 1986-87 edition, 401 occupations are described, covering about 80 percent of US employ-
ment. Detailed information is available for 196 occupations, covering about 60 percent of employment.8
B.1.2 Swedish microdata
The main outcomes we study come from Swedish microdata. We obtain basic demographic (year of birth,
gender, education, and county of residence) and labor market (employment status, annual earnings, and
industry) variables from the Integrated Database for Labour Market Research (LISA), a collection of
administrative registers that is—like all our other Swedish data sources—provided by Statistics Sweden.
During the period 1985-2013, LISA contains one observation per year on every individual aged 16-64
living in Sweden. Employment status and industry (as well as county of residence) are measured in
November each year.
We also use individual-level data from the Swedish Public Employment Service (PES), which contain
information on the total number of days registered with the PES, number of days registered as unem-
ployed, and number of days spent in retraining programs administered by the PES, for all individuals
ever registered with the PES during the years 1992-2013.
Our data on workers’ occupations come from the population censuses, which were conducted every
five years from 1960-1990, and from the Wage Structure Statistics (WSS) for the years 1996-2013.9 The
WSS contains the population of public sector workers and a sample of about 50 percent of private sector
workers. Sampling is at the level of firms, and large firms are over-sampled. We apply sampling weights
when working with the occupation variable from the WSS.
8The number of distinct occupations in the OOH, as well as the number of occupations covered in detail, tends to increase
over time. This means that our crosswalk from the 1986-87 to the 2018-19 edition is mostly, though not always, one-to-many.
9We also obtain individual-level earnings data for 1975 and 1980 from the population censuses, which we use for falsifica-
tion checks.
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A useful feature of our data is that, in the 1985 and 1990 censuses, workers’ occupation is coded using
a 5-digit classification, YRKE5, containing about 1,400 distinct occupations. This allows us to accurately
merge occupation-level information from the US (see below). Unfortunately, such detailed occupation
codes are not available after 1990. From 1996-2013, a 3-digit classification containing 172 distinct codes,
SSYK96, is available in the WSS. This classification is of a different nature than YRKE5, and the cross-
walk between YRKE5 and SSYK96 likely introduces measurement error in workers’ occupations after
1990.10 This is an important caveat to our analysis of occupational employment shifts and individual
workers’ occupational mobility during 1985-2013.
Finally, adding the 1960 census allows us to calculate prior occupational employment changes at the
3-digit level using the YRKE3 classification, a coarser version of YRKE5 (there are 229 distinct codes
that cover the period 1960-85).11
B.1.3 NLSY data
Since the main focus of our study is Sweden, which has better data, we try wherever possible to select
and analyze US data in a way that is as close as possible to what we do in Sweden. We only depart from
this when data availability or quality necessitate using alternative approaches.
The main dataset we use to study occupational decline and its consequences in the US is the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY 1979), because it is one of the few panel datasets that are repre-
sentative of a relevant age group in the US during the period we want to study. NLSY79 has a detailed
set of occupation codes that are important for our analysis, since they can be readily matched to the 1986
Occupational Outlook Handbook (OOH).
Specifically, for years through 2010 we use the 1979–2010 release, from Bo¨hm (2013)12 with updated
weights to include only those in the sample as of 1987 (see below), and updates for recent errata from
the NLSY.13 For 2012 and 2014, we use the 1979–2014 data release.
The NLSY79 Cohort is comprised of individuals born between 1957 and 1964. These people were
beginning their careers in the late 1980s, the time of interest identified in the analysis of Swedish data.
NLSY79 surveys were conducted annually from 1979–1994 and on a biennial basis thereafter. We
use data until and including the 2014 round, which covers earnings until 2013—the year in which our
Swedish data end.
To construct the occupational life-cycle profiles, discussed in detail below, we need a larger sample
than is available in the NLSY. As in Acemoglu and Autor (2011), we use individual-level data containing
information on age, gender, race, education, employment status, occupation, hours and weeks worked,
as well as annual labor income from the 1980 US Census, accessed through the IPUMS website (Rug-
gles, Alexander, Genadek, Goeken, Schroeder, and Sobek, 2010). We construct education and income
variables in the same way as Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
To convert income to $2014, we use the chained Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers
10Within broad types of jobs, SSYK96 also distinguishes occupations by the skill level of the workers.
11The Swedish word yrke means occupation. SSYK stands for (the Swedish translation of) Swedish Standard Classification
of Occupations.
12We thank Michael Bo¨hm for generously sharing this data and his expertise.
13We use updated income for the “Revised Income Variables Incorrectly Coded” (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018b) and
updated occupations for “Erroneous Occupation Codes (2002 and 2004)” (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018a)
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(CPI-U), published by the BLS and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (2018).
B.2 Construction of variables
B.2.1 Occupation variables (OOH)
Using the reported employment numbers from our two editions of the OOH, we calculate the percentage
growth in employment 1984-2016.14 We manually map occupations across the two editions. If, after a
careful search, a 1986-87 occupation has no counterpart in the 2018-19 edition, we classify it as having
vanished, and assigned a percentage growth of -100.15 While few occupations actually disappeared,
examples of occupations that declined sharply include both white-collar occupations (typists, drafters,
and telephone operators) and blue-collar ones (precision assemblers, welders, and butchers).
We also record for each US occupation its projected employment growth from the 1986-87 OOH.
The BLS bases these predictions on (forecasts of) the size and demographic composition of the labor
force, aggregate economic growth, commodity final demand, industry-level output and employment, the
input-output matrix, and occupational employment and vacancies. The forecasts are not reported in
percentage terms but grouped into the categories “declining”, “little or no change”, “increasing slower
than average”, “increasing about as fast as average”, and “increasing faster than average”. We create
a cardinal predicted growth index assigning these categories the numbers 1-5 (where higher numbers
correspond to more positive predicted employment changes). We report results both from using this
index and using the categorical outlook variable.16
B.2.2 Merging of OOH variables to Swedish microdata, and defining occupational decline
In order to merge the OOH-based variables to Swedish data, we map the 401 1986-87 OOH occupations
to the 1,396 5-digit Swedish occupation codes available in the 1985 census. We successfully map 379
US occupations to 1,094 Swedish occupations—we are able to find corresponding US occupations for
91 percent of Swedish workers in 1985. We map percentage changes in US employment 1984-2016,
as well as 1986-87 OOH predictions (categorical and index), to Swedish 5-digit occupations using our
crosswalk, applying weights (OOH 1984 employment shares) in the case of many-to-one matches.
We define a Swedish 5-digit occupation as declining if the weighted employment growth of its cor-
responding OOH occupations is negative and larger (in absolute magnitude) than 25 percent. We regard
this as a sensible threshold: smaller declines may be the result of measurement error, as we had to exer-
cise judgment in matching OOH occupations over time. At the same time, we report robustness checks
using a number of alternative thresholds. We also use information from the OOH to determine whether
technology likely played a role in the decline.17 In 1985, 13 percent of Swedish employees worked in
14The 1986-87 OOH reports employment numbers for 1984, while the 2018-19 edition reports 2016 employment figures.
15Between the 1986-87 and 2018-19 editions of the OOH, some occupations were split or merged, which we take into
account when computing the percentage growth. The details of this calculation are discussed later in this section.
16Veneri (1997) uses US employment data to evaluate the ex-post accuracy of the projections used in the 1986-87 OOH, and
concludes that they correctly foresaw most occupational trends, although there were also non-trivial sources of error.
17To determine whether technology played a role in the decline, we proceeded as follows. We first applied the 25-percent
cutoff to the OOH data to identify the declining occupations in the US. For the declining occupations we searched their detailed
descriptions in the 1986-87 OOH for discussions of potential replacement of human labor by specific technologies, such as
computers or robots. For the occupations lacking detailed descriptions in the 1986-87 OOH, we further searched one and
two decades ahead, using the 1996-97 and 2006-07 editions (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1996, 2006), since in some cases
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subsequently declining occupations, and 8 percent worked in subsequently declining occupations where
the decline is likely linked to technology. We now provide more details on the process.
B.2.2.1 Assigning US OOH employment growth to Swedish occupations given a hypothetically un-
changing OOH classification
For clarity, we first describe what the calculation of employment growth would be if the OOH classifica-
tion had not changed between the 1986-87 and 2018-19 editions. We then describe the adjustments we
make given that the OOH classification did change.18
The percentage change that we assign to each Swedish occupation s in the hypothetical case of an
unchanging OOH classification is given by
gs ≡
Ns,2016−Ns,1984
Ns,1984
, (OA2)
where Ns,t ≡∑k∈Ks Nk,t is the sum of all year-t employment in the k ∈Ks OOH occupations to which the
Swedish YRKE5 occupation is matched. This percentage change can alternatively be expressed as
gs ≡ αs
1×K
× g
K×1
, (OA3)
where the vector αs is a vector of weights of length K, where K is the total number of OOH occupations
in the 1986-87 OOH. Each element αs,k represents the share of OOH occupation k in the mapping to
Swedish occupation s, and it is based on the employment figures in the initial period 1984.19 Thus,
αs,k ∈ [0,1], the vector αs differs between Swedish YRKE5 occupations and its elements always sum to
one. The vector g is filled with the 1984-2016 growth rates of all K OOH occupations. Formally,
αs,k ≡
✶k∈Ks×Nk,1984
∑k∈Ks Nk,1984
, gk ≡
Nk,2016−Nk,1984
Nk,1984
.
occupations were re-grouped and so received detailed descriptions in those editions. Note that, while the OOH contains little
backward-looking information on technology’s role, it provides rich information on imminent technological changes expected
to affect occupations. Conditional on an OOH occupation being classified as declining, we regard this information as reliable
with respect to technology’s role in the decline.
For those OOH occupations that we identified to have undergone technology-related declines, we map employment growth
to Swedish 5-digit occupations creating a separate variable, technology-related employment growth. We define a Swedish
5-digit occupation as declining and linked to technology if the technology-related employment growth in the corresponding
OOH occupations is below negative 25 percent. All technology-related declining occupations are declining occupations by
construction, but some declining occupations may not be classified as having a technology link.
18In the analysis of the NLSY data, we assign the percentage change to the relevant NLSY occupational codes using the
same procedure.
19Note that the 1986-87 OOH uses data from 1984. Thus, the initial period is 1984 as far as US employment figures are
concerned, but the data are extracted from a 1986 publication.
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The equivalence of (OA2) and (OA3) is easily shown:
gs ≡
Ns,2016−Ns,1984
Ns,1984
≡
∑k∈Ks Nk,2016−∑k∈Ks Nk,1984
∑k∈Ks Nk,1984
≡
∑k∈Ks Nk,1984×gk
∑k∈Ks Nk,1984
≡∑
k
✶k∈Ks×Nk,1984×gk
∑k∈Ks Nk,1984
≡∑
k
αs,k×gk
≡ αs×g.
B.2.2.2 Assigning US OOH employment growth to Swedish occupations given the changing OOH clas-
sification
The computation of the total changes in equation (OA2), or the weights and changes in equation (OA3)
would be straightforward if the OOH occupation classification remained constant between the 1986-87
and 2018-19 editions. Alas, it did not, and so we need to adjust the calculation for any splits and merges
that took place.
To see this, consider the following example: the OOH occupation “343 Metal pourers and casters,
basic shapes” had employment 12,000 in 1984. By 2016, it had been merged with sixteen other occu-
pations to “Metal and Plastic Machine Workers”, with employment 1,039,600. It is obviously wrong to
calculate the change in occupation “343 Metal pourers and casters, basic shapes” as a more than 85-fold
increase:
g343 =
1,039,600−12,000
12,000
= 85.63
Instead, it is reasonable to sum the employment of all the seventeen merged occupations in 1984, with a
total employment of 1,457,000, and calculate the change as
gˆ343 =
1,039,600−1,457,000
1,457,000
=−0.286
obtaining a 28.6% decline.
However, what happens to the weights in αs? If we were to weight the “343 Metal pourers and
casters, basic shapes” by their adjusted employment figure for 1984 (1,457,000), this occupation would
seem 121 larger than it actually was (12,000). This creates problems when “343 Metal pourers and
casters, basic shapes” is matched to a Swedish YRKE5 occupation that is also matched to other OOH
occupations.
Consider, for instance, the Swedish YRKE5 occupation “732.50 Precision founder” to which “343
Metal pourers and casters, basic shapes” is matched, together with another OOH occupation “344 Mold-
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ers and casters, hand”.
Swedish YRKE5 occupation OOH occupation Employment
in 1984
gˆk
732.50 Precision founder 343 Metal pourers and casters,
basic shapes
12,000 -0.286
344 Molders and casters, hand 17,000 -1.000
“344 Molders and casters, hand” was larger than “343 Metal pourers and casters, basic shapes” in
1984, and disappeared completely between 1984 and 2016. It seems like we should assign the Swedish
YRKE5 occupation “732.50 Precision founders” a decline somewhere in between -28.6% and -100%,
but closer to -100% since the disappearing occupation dominates. However, if we were to use adjusted
employment figures when calculating the weights, “343 Metal pourers and casters, basic shapes” would
be weighted as follows:
αˆs,343 =
1,457,000
1,457,000+17,000
= 0.988
That is, “343 Metal pourers and casters, basic shapes” would seem to account for almost all employment
in the Swedish YRKE5 occupation, instead of less than half. This means that the weighted change will
be mistakenly computed as
αˆs,343× gˆ343+αs,344× gˆ344
= 0.988× (−0.286)+0.012× (−1.00) =−0.295
Instead, we ought to use the original employment figures when calculating the weights. Then,
αs,343 =
12,000
12,000+17,000
= 0.414
i.e. the OOH occupation “343 Metal pourers and casters, basic shapes” makes up 41.4% of employment
in the Swedish YRKE5 occupation. Thus,
αs,343× gˆ343+αs,344× gˆ344
= 0.414× (−0.286)+0.586× (−1.00) =−0.704
That is, the employment growth assigned to “732.50 Precision founders” should be -70.5%. We will thus
treat weights and growth rates separately: The weights αs are computed using the original employment
figures, and the growth rates gk are computed using the adjusted employment figures,
gˆs = αs× gˆ. (OA4)
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The formal definition of our declining indicator is thus
Declinings ≡ ✶{αs× gˆ<−0.25}.
It remains to specify how exactly the growth rates should be adjusted for splits and merges.20
• One-to-one: OOH occupations that were neither split or merged between the 1986-87 and 2018-19
editions of the OOH. No adjustment is needed, and the growth rate is defined as above,
gˆk = gk ≡
Nk,2016−Nk,1984
Nk,1984
.
• Many-to-one merge: Many 1984 occupations k ∈ K (where K is a set of 1984 occupations) were
merged into one 2016 occupation k˜. 1984 employment figures of all merged occupations are
summed and compared to the 2016 figures.
gˆk∈K =
Nk˜,2016−∑k∈KNk,1984
∑k∈KNk,1984
• One-to-many split: One 1984 occupation k was split into many 2016 occupations k˜ ∈ K˜ (where K˜
is a set of 2016 occupations). The 2016 employment figures of all resulting splits are added and
compared to the 1984 figures.
gˆk =
∑k˜∈K˜Nk˜,2016−Nk,1984
Nk,1984
• Many-to-many: Many 1984 occupations k ∈ K (where K is a set of 1984 occupations) were dis-
tributed into many 2016 occupations k˜ ∈ K˜ (where K˜ is a set of 2016 occupations). The 1984 and
2016 employment figures are added and compared.
gˆk∈K =
∑k˜∈K˜Nk˜,2016−∑k∈KNk,1984
∑k∈KNk,1984
B.2.2.3 Identifying technology-related declines
Having calculated the adjusted employment growth gˆk for all occupations present in the 1986-87 OOH,
we concentrate on those that declined sharply, gˆk < −0.25, and check whether there is a probable tech-
nological driver behind the decline. For this we first consult the 1986-87 OOH, and if we find nothing
there, we check in the 1996 OOH (BLS, 1996), and if we still find nothing, we check the 2006 version
(BLS, 2006).21 Each OOH occupation thus is assigned an indicator variable for technological-related
decline, which equals zero whenever gˆk ≥−0.25, and may equal zero or one when gˆk <−0.25.
20We have excluded four OOH occupations that were merged with or split into an unknown number of occupations: “71
Electroencephalographic technologists and technicians”, “203 Public administration— chief executives, legislators, and general
administrators”, “226 Customer service representatives, utilities” and “293 Electric meter installers and repairers”.
21There were four heavily declining (gˆk < −0.25) OOH occupations where we found no information in the OOH editions
of 1986, 1996, or 2006, but we still suspected technologically-related decline. Therefore, we searched in other editions of the
OOH and other sources, and found potential technological drivers of occupational decline:
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We can then decompose the employment growth assigned to each Swedish YRKE5 occupation as
follows:
gˆs ≡ αs
1×K
×✶{technology}
K×K
× gˆ
K×1
+ αs
1×K
×
(
I−✶{technology}
)
K×K
× gˆ
K×1
, (OA5)
where ✶{technology} is a diagonal matrix with the indicator for technologically-related decline on the
diagonal, and I is the identity matrix. We define a Swedish YRKE5 as having undergone technology-
related decline if it is classified as declining and if the first component of the decomposition (OA5) is
less than −0.25, formally
[Declining (technology)]s ≡ ✶{αs× gˆ<−0.25 and αs×✶{technology}× gˆ<−0.25}.
B.2.3 Swedish micro-level variables
In addition to the occupational data, we construct several variables that characterize workers’ career
outcomes spanning the years 1986-2013; that is, starting with the first year after we measure treatment
and ending with the last year available in our data. We start by simply summing up years observed
as employed and real annual labor earnings, obtaining the variables cumulative years employed and
cumulative earnings.22 Following Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song (2014), we also create a normalized
measure of cumulative earnings, whereby we divide cumulative earnings by predicted initial earnings.
Cumulative earnings normalized in this way thus give the multiple of (predicted) initial earnings that a
worker receives during 1986-2013.23 We consider further earnings measures—such as rank, discounted
cumulative earnings, and earnings growth—in robustness checks.
Our measure of long-run occupational mobility is a dummy variable equaling one if the individual
worked in the same 3-digit SSYK96 occupation in 2013 as 1985. It equals zero if the individual works
in a different occupation or is not employed.24 Using the PES data, we calculate cumulative days spent
unemployed and cumulative days spent in retraining during 1992-2013. We define dummy variables
213 Radio operators “Laborsaving [sic] technical advances such as computer-controlled pro-
gramming and remotely controlled transmitters” (regarding Broadcast
and sound engineering technicians and radio operators, BLS 2004:260)
254 Telegraph and teletype operators Automatic routing of calls, voice message systems (regarding Tele-
phone operators, BLS 1994:291)
346 Motion picture projectionists Digital projection (Hess, 2014)
391 Service station attendants Self-service pumps at petrol stations (Emek Basker and Klimek, 2015)
22We define a worker as employed in a given year if they are identified as working in November (when employment status
is measured for the purposes of LISA) of that year and if annual earnings during that year are no lower than the base amount.
When we do not observe an individual in a given year—due to emigration or death—we set employment and earnings to zero.
23The prediction comes from a regression of log earnings on a quartic in age and dummies for gender, county, and seven
education categories, run separately for each 3-digit SSYK96 occupation in 1985. We divide by predicted rather than actual
initial earnings to eliminate transitory earnings variation, which would introduce an important role for mean reversion into the
distribution of normalized cumulative earnings. Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song (2014) divide cumulative earnings by earnings
averaged across four pre-treatment years for the same reason. Since we do not have annual earnings information prior to 1985,
we normalize by predicted earnings instead.
24Our measure of occupational mobility does not capture any temporary exits during the intervening years if workers returned
to their initial occupation. A limitation of our data is that they are not conducive to studying high-frequency occupational
mobility: During the years 1986-1989 and 1991-1995, we do not observe workers’ occupation. And during 1996-2004, the
SSYK96 variable contains substantially fewer distinct codes than from 2005 onwards.
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for ever unemployed and ever having participated in retraining. As the PES data are not available for
1986-1991, we cannot capture any unemployment or retraining in these early years of our sample period.
Finally, we calculate the retirement age, where we define retirement as a continuous spell of zero annual
earnings up to and including age 64.25
B.2.4 NLSY variables
Here we provide more detail about the construction of the variables in the NLSY data; where possible
we tried to follow the procedure we used for the Swedish data, but some data constraints required us to
adapt the procedure as follows.
B.2.4.1 Occupation and industry codes
As in our analysis of changes in Sweden, we use the OOH as the source for occupational employment
growth and to identify declining occupations, again defining decline as a contraction in OOH-equivalent
occupational employment by more than 25 percent from 1984-2016. To calculate OOH-equivalent em-
ployment growth for each occupation in the NLSY, we employ the exact same procedure as for the
Swedish data and as described in the previous appendix section, with one exception as described below.
B.2.4.1.1 NLSY79 occupation data
We consider only the primary employer in our analysis and use the 1980 census code data (which is only
available for the primary employer) from 1987–2000. The primary employer is determined based in CPS
criteria26 from 1982-1994 and is coded for each person’s main job (“job #1”) from 1994-2000 (Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 2018c). From 2002 onward, NLSY79 occupation is reported only on the basis of
the 2000 census codes, for all employers; we consider only the occupation associated with each person’s
main job.
B.2.4.1.2 1980 to 2000 Census mapping
Because 1980 census and 2000 census occupations are not reported simultaneously, it is necessary to
bridge the two. To do this, we use the tables from Autor and Dorn (2013), which convert each of the
1980 and 2000 census codes to a unique 1990 occupation code (henceforth, these unique codes are
referred to as “1990 occupation code(s)”).
25The LISA database includes individuals older than 64 only during later years. As we do not consistently observe individuals
beyond age 64, we assume for all years that individuals aged 65 or older have retired.
26The CPS employer is identified as follows:
• For those not at work during the survey week but who worked for pay since the last interview–the CPS employer is the
most recent employer
• For those who worked during the survey week: for one employer–the CPS employer is the current employer; for two or
more employers–the CPS employer is the employer for whom the respondent worked the most hours; for two or more
employers with the same number of hours each employer–the CPS employer is the employer for whom the respondent
worked the longest
• For those absent from their regular job during the survey week but who were working temporarily for another employer–
the CPS employer is the current employer not the employer of absence
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B.2.4.1.3 OOH 1986-87 to 2018-19
With one exception, the occupational decline calculations are identical to those used in the analysis of
the Swedish data. The exception is that an additional mapping is necessary because in the NLSY data,
managers are often not separated by the types of occupations they manage.
Both the 1986-87 and 2018-19 OOH include aggregate measures for some occupational groupings.
In particular, for the “Managers and Administrators” grouping. We take the following steps to determine
occupational growth and predicted growth for these occupations. We first separate those occupations
with an exact three-way-match between the 1986-87 OOH, 2018-19 OOH, and 1980 Census codes27
and calculate occupational growth for each of these occupations. We then subtract the occupational
employment for these managers from the total for all managers and administrators in each of 1986-87
and 2018-19. We use these totals to calculate occupational growth for a constructed occupation: “All
other managers”, which is used in the same way as any other occupation for all managers not in the three
categories with an exact match.
B.2.4.1.4 Census (1980) codes to 1986-87 OOH
The OOH reports occupations on a different basis than the 1980 census occupational coding, which is
used in both the NLSY79 in 1987 the 1980 census. To determine which individuals were working in
declining occupations as of 1987, we create a crosswalk from the 1980 census occupations to those
reported in the 1986 OOH.
We map the 1980 census codes to the 1986-87 OOH occupations primarily based on occupation de-
scription. Additionally, both the 1980 census classification of occupations and 1986 OOH classification
were developed to be consistent with the 1980 Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) Manual. The
major occupation groups between the two are therefore similar and also informed the mappings.
As the OOH does not cover all occupations (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1986), there are some occu-
pations reported in the NLSY79 that cannot be matched to OOH occupations. Because reliable data on
the growth of the occupation is not available, individuals in those occupations as of 1987 are excluded
from our analysis.
B.2.4.1.5 Occupation and industry groupings
For the purposes of occupation switching (see below), we group occupations based on their 1990 oc-
cupation codes, using modified groupings from Autor and Dorn (2013). Here, Autor and Dorn (2013)
separately classify detailed occupations for low-skill service occupations and for non-service occupa-
tions. The only cases in which occupations are classified in both categories is as police/fire occupations
also being classified as protective service. We use the protective service categorization, which also in-
cludes guards, as the relevant group for these occupations.
In addition to the occupation groups based on the 1990 occupation codes, we also group occupations
based on the 1980 census codes to create base year statistics. Here, occupations are grouped based on
27These occupations are (in 2018-19 OOH parlance): Education administrators, Medical and health services managers, and
Property, real estate, and community association managers.
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the separations (bolded and/or italicized breaks in the text) in the “1980 Occupational Codes” section of
United States Bureau of the Census (1980).
Finally, we include an industry group dummy in the regressions. For this purpose, industries were
grouped based on separations of the “1980 Industry Codes” section of United States Bureau of the Census
(1980).
B.2.4.1.6 Occupation switching
A respondent is considered to have remained in the same occupation if the 1990 occupation code for
their occupation in the year of interest is the same as the 1990 occupation code for their occupation in
the initial year. We restrict the sample for comparison in each year to those interviewed in that year.
Respondents whose occupation was not reported are treated as switching occupations.
Because both the occupation group and major occupation group categories are calculated from the
same 1990 census codes, the comparison is for occupational category switching is direct.
B.2.4.2 Income
The income measure we use is total income from wages and salary in the prior calendar year. Reported
income is truncated for privacy reasons. The procedure used in NLSY79 for top coding takes the top two
percent of respondents with valid values and averages them. That averaged value replaces the values for
all respondents in the top range.
We use two main measures of income in our analysis of NLSY79 outcomes. In addition to cumulative
income, which is an outcome of interest in the Swedish analysis, we also consider average income.
In all cases, we follow the logic outlined in Dahl and Lochner (2012) and restrict those included
in the regression to those with at least 8 years of income data. This minimum ensures that income is
available throughout the period of interest rather than select years in the beginning or end. In practice,
enforcing the minimum means excluding 877 person-years of reported income from 283 individuals
from the average income regressions. 60% of these years of excluded reported income occurred during
or before 1991; individuals with income only in the first few years cannot be reasonably compared with
individuals with income throughout the period.
We also tested the sensitivity of the results to changes in the minimum number of years needed for
income projection and inclusion in the regression and found no substantial difference with the results
reported.
The first income measure, cumulative income, allows for direct comparability with the Swedish
results. Cumulative income is calculated beginning with the 1988 income (from the 1989 survey round).
Income accumulates through the last year of projection and includes years in which income was imputed
or projected as outlined below.
Because cumulative income is a key variable of interest, and NLSY79 interviews are conducted only
in even years beginning in 1994, we impute income where possible so that results on cumulative income,
the same basis as the Swedish results, can be calculated. This procedure, which is described in detail
below, is also used to impute income in survey years for individuals who were not interviewed or were
missing income data, to maintain a sample of people that is as representative as possible of the US
population of the relevant age groups.
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Due to attrition in the sample, accumulating income over the full period reduces the size of the
available sample, which is not fully resolved by the extrapolation and imputation. To more fully use
the data available, we also consider average income, and compare results under alternative calculation
specifications.
In the calculation most similar to that for cumulative income, average income is calculated over the
years in which income is interpolated and projected, beginning with 1988 income.
To test the sensitivity of the results to our income imputation procedure, we also use an additional
calculation of average income using only reported income. However, due to the missing survey years
later in the sample period, this places twice the weight on early-career years (prior to 2002) as it does on
mid-late career years.
To address the uneven weighting between early and late-career earnings, we add our final specifica-
tion. Here, we use only the income reported in even survey years (beginning in 1990), which results in
even weighting across the full period.
B.2.4.2.1 Imputation procedure
The imputation procedure largely follows that laid out in the appendix to Dahl and Lochner (2012),
relying on additional information available from the NLSY to improve the imputation in the case of
respondents who were deceased. We also use information for the non-survey years later in the sample to
a greater extent than Dahl and Lochner (2012). We therefore treat these missing years the same as any
other years in which an income was not reported.
There are 6,679 individuals in the sample who both have all necessary covariates and meet the cri-
teria below for income imputation. Considering only these individuals, imputing and projecting income
allows us to increase the weighted person-years included in the average income regression by 73%, 96%
of which comes from interpolation, not extrapolation. The vast majority of this increase comes from
the non-survey years, with imputation and extrapolation for these years accounting for 91% of all im-
putations and extrapolations. Unweighted people-years increase from 95,631 to 167,132, with nearly
identical sources of the increase.
Again considering this set of eligible respondents, the number of people not responding to the NLSY
increases over time. In 2000, 690 of the 6,679 included in our restricted sample were not interviewed.
By 2014, that number had increased to 1,422.
Considering only the years in which a survey was conducted, although the number missing income
data is growing with time, because we limit extrapolation (see below), the number of people for whom
income is imputed in a survey year peaks (at 902) in 2002. In the survey years, the total number of
imputed and extrapolated income data is 8,002: 64% (5,089) of these occur due to non-response to the
survey; 26% (2,051) due to an unknown income; 10% (779) due to refusal; the remainder (83) due to the
question being skipped.
To impute income, we used the following steps:
1. Convert income from $1979 to $2014, using CPI-U (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 2018)
2. Following Dahl and Lochner (2012), restrict the analysis to individuals with income data in at least
8 years from 1986 to 2013.
26
3. Regress income on age and age squared (as of the middle of the year in which income is earned),
using OLS separately for each individual. The income considered in the regression is all income
reported for 1986 to 2013. Years in this range where no survey was conducted or the respondent
wasn’t surveyed or didn’t answer the income question are treated as missing data in the regression.
4. For years where income data are available we use them; when they are not we use predicted income
values from the regression above, adjusted as explained below.
5. To be consistent with the way NLS report income, and to avoid implausible negative labor income,
we winsorize predicted values:
(a) To 0 at bottom end.
(b) To average of top 2% if in top 2%.28
6. Use winsorized predicted values when income is missing and Reason for Non-Interview (RNI) is
not death.
7. Set income to 0 if RNI is death, or was death in any previous year in the case of odd years where
no survey was conducted.
B.2.4.2.2 Extrapolation
Extrapolation (both forward from the last year observed and backward from the first year observed),
in the cases where it is used, is limited to 2 years. For example, if someone’s last observed income is
2009 income (observed in 2010 survey round), predicted income is used for 2010 and 2011. Income
thereafter is treated as missing. We chose to limit extrapolation to two years to strike a balance between
two competing objectives: getting as many person-years as possible to keep the sample as representative
as possible and not relying on the functional form of the regressions to impute values many years away
from where we observe actual earnings. Extrapolating more than two years may result in implausibly
large earnings if, say, the second order polynomial has a positive and increasing slope at the ends of the
sample years for which we have data.
Income of 0 due to the respondent being deceased is considered known, not extrapolated, income
(i.e. it is not excluded due to the cap on projections). However, in the specifications below that refer to
“reported income”, only the values in survey years are considered in the averages. This is done so the
potential years of income are the same whether or not the respondent died during the period considered.
B.2.4.3 Employment
Data on employment and unemployment come from the weekly status arrays, which are based on the
respondent’s full employment history. The employment history is constructed using job tenures at each
of the employers reported to the NLSY, and therefore also includes information for years in which the
respondent was not interviewed. This allows us to view a more complete employment history than what
is reported in the survey-year job data.
28To use imputed income consistently with reported income, the same procedure was followed. If imputed or extrapolated
income in a year was at least as high as the bottom threshold of the top 2% in that year, we assigned to the individual the mean
of the top 2% earnings in that year.
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As in the income regressions, we restrict the sample to those with at least 8 years (measured as 418
weeks) where labor force status is reported, beginning in 1987. The average weeks reported (beginning
in 1988) for those included in the regressions is 1,310. As the result of the restriction on the sample, we
exclude 247 individuals, with an average of 234 weeks of reported labor force status (beginning in 1988)
from these regressions.
A respondent is considered employed if their reported status is employed, “associated with an em-
ployer” or in active military service. A respondent is considered unemployed if their reported status is
unemployed. The remaining categories “not working (unemployment vs. out of the labor force cannot
be determined)” and “out of the labor force” are considered to be out of the labor force, completing the
mapping.
B.2.4.4 Occupation life-cycle profiles
To construct occupation life-cycle profiles, we require a large sample to determine how income in each
occupation develops over the course of a person’s career. The NLSY does not provide a sufficient sample
size for this, so we instead construct these profiles using data from the 1980 census, which uses the same
occupation codes as the 1987 survey year of the NLSY79. The calculation methodology follows that used
for the Swedish data. The lifecycle information of the individual occupation is used unless there were
fewer than 500 people in the occupation in the 1980 census, in which case the profile for the occupation
group (based on 1980 census codes) is used. The process used is outlined below.
1. In the census data, restricting the population to those of working age who have non-zero earnings,
hours, and weeks worked:
(a) Convert pre-tax wage and salary income (“income”) from $1979 to $2014
(b) Separately for each occupation, regress log income on a quartic in age and dummies for
sex, county, and education. Here we use a quartic regression because we are considering
the progression of income over the full lifecycle of the occupation and have a large enough
sample size to alleviate concerns of overfitting.
2. In the NLSY data
(a) Regress log of base year (1987) income on a quadratic in age and dummies for sex, region,
education, and occupation to get predicted base year income. As the age range of this sample
is much narrower, the benefits of a higher-order polynomial in age are reduced, while the
smaller sample of the NLSY for a particular occupation heightens concerns of overfitting.
(b) Calculate predicted log base year income for each person using the fitted values from the
regression above
(c) Generate predicted log income growth in each year by summing mean real wage growth and
the expected growth based on aging, calculated by applying the occupation-specific coeffi-
cients on the quartic in age from the census regression to the change in each of those values
in each year
(d) Calculate predicted income in each year by adding predicted log income growth to the pre-
dicted log base year income and exponentiating
28
Cumulative predicted income is the sum of predicted income from 1988 – 2013.
B.2.4.5 Individual controls
The full set of individual controls includes birth year, sex, region (referred to collectively as “demo-
graphics”), education, and base year income. We use the four regions available in the NSLY79 data to
control for geographic variation, as state-level data is not available in the public-use NLSY79 data. For
education, we use 5 categories, ranging from < High school to ≥ Masters, rather than the 7 used in the
Swedish analysis, as compulsory education requirements vary by state.
B.2.4.6 Sample weighting
We use the NLSY79 Custom Weighting Program to calculate weights for all individuals in the selected
sample who were interviewed in the 1987 survey. Cross-sectional weights available directly from the
NLS at the time of writing are incorrect due to the exclusion of 401 NLSY79 respondents from the
sample when calculating the weights (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018a).
B.3 Sample Restrictions
B.3.1 Swedish Data Sample restrictions
Our starting sample contains all individuals born between 1921-1969—hence aged 16-64 (at some point)
in 1985—who were employed in November 1985, whose annual earnings in 1985 were no less than the
“base amount” (Swedish: basbelopp) specified by the social security administration, and about whom
we have complete demographic (including education) and labor market information (including industry
and occupation). The base amount is used as an accounting unit when calculating benefits, and it is
typically equal to about three months’ worth of full-time work at the median wage. As we do not observe
hours worked or fulltime status, we use the base amount to exclude individuals with little labor market
attachment. There are 3,061,051 individuals fulfilling the above criteria.29 Our baseline sample further
restricts birth year to 1949-1960, or ages 25-36 in 1985. We drop younger workers as these are less
likely to be attached to the labor market and may not yet have settled on an occupation. And we drop
middle-aged and older workers from our baseline sample because we want to focus on workers who did
not reach retirement age by 2013, the end of our period of study, in our main analysis. We will analyze
workers born before 1949 separately.
B.3.2 NLSY Data Sample restrictions
We want to study people who have likely completed their schooling before the start of the period; at the
same time, we want to use the same variation from the OOH that we used in Sweden. The balance of
these two factors leads us to choose 1987 as a base year for the NLSY analysis, since by that year the
youngest people covered in the NLSY will have reached age 22, and (in most cases) will have completed
their education.
29There were 5,281,382 individuals aged 16-64 in Sweden in 1985. Of those, 4,186,512 were employed in November 1985,
and among them, 3,648,034 earned no less than the base amount during 1985. The reduction to 3,061,051 is due to missing
education, industry, or occupation information, including cases where YRKE5 occupations do not have matches in the OOH.
29
Given the choices above, we focus on samples of people whose histories we can study over the
long run: the cross-sectional sample and the supplemental black and Hispanic samples. We exclude
the economically disadvantaged non-black/non-Hispanic supplemental sample as it was discontinued in
1990 and the military supplemental sample, most of which was discontinued in 1984.
In addition to these restrictions, we impose additional restrictions based on data availability, as dis-
cussed above, on the sample when analyzing earnings.
30
References
ACEMOGLU, D., AND D. AUTOR (2011): “Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for Employment and Earnings,”
vol. 4 of Handbook of Labor Economics, chap. 12, pp. 1043–1171. Elsevier.
AUTOR, D. H., AND D. DORN (2013): “The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the US Labor Market,”
American Economic Review, 103(5), 1553–1597.
AUTOR, D. H., D. DORN, G. H. HANSON, AND J. SONG (2014): “Trade Adjustment: Worker-Level Evidence,” The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 129(4), 1799–1860.
BLS (1986): Occupational Outlook Handbook.
(1994): Occupational Outlook Handbook.
(1996): Occupational Outlook Handbook.
(2004): Occupational Outlook Handbook.
(2006): Occupational Outlook Handbook.
BO¨HM, M. J. (2013): “Has Job Polarization Squeezed the Middle Class? Evidence from the Allocation of Talents,” CEP
Discussion Papers dp1215, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (1986): Occupational Outlook Handbook, 1986-87 Edition: Bulletin of the United States
Bureau of Labor Statistics, No. 2250. US Department of Labor.
(1996): Occupational Outlook Handbook, 1996-97. Bernan Assoc.
(2006): Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2006-07 Edition. US Department of Labor.
(2018a): “NLSY79 Errata for 1979—2014 Data Release,” .
(2018b): “NLSY79 Errata for 1979–2012 Data Release,” .
(2018c): “NLSY79 Topical Guide to the Data: Employment,” .
(2018d): Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2018-2019 Edition. Bernan Press.
DAHL, G. B., AND L. LOCHNER (2012): “The Impact of Family Income on Child Achievement: Evidence from the Earned
Income Tax Credit,” American Economic Review, 102(5), 1927–56.
EMEK BASKER, L. F., AND S. KLIMEK (2015): “Customer-Labor Substitution: Evidence fromGasoline Stations,” Discussion
Paper 15-45, Center for Economic Studies.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (2018): “Consumer Price Index, 1913-,” .
HESS, A. E. (2014): “America’s disappearing jobs,” .
JACOBSON, L. S., R. J. LALONDE, AND D. G. SULLIVAN (1993): “Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers,” The American
Economic Review, 83(4), 685–709.
KAMBOUROV, G., AND I. MANOVSKII (2009): “Occupational specificity of human capital,” International Economic Review,
50(1), 63–115.
PISSARIDES, C. A. (2000): Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd Edition. The MIT Press.
ROY, A. D. (1951): “Some Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings,” Oxford Economic Papers, 3(2), 135–146.
31
RUGGLES, S., J. T. ALEXANDER, K. GENADEK, R. GOEKEN, M. B. SCHROEDER, AND M. SOBEK (2010): “Integrated
Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0 [Machine-readable database],” Discussion paper, Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota, 2010.
UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS (1980): 1980 Census of Population: Alphabetic Index of Industries and Occupa-
tions.
VENERI, C. M. (1997): “Evaluating the 1995 occupational employment projections,”Monthly Labor Review, 120.
32
C Appendix figures and tables
33
Declining
-.1 -.05 0 .05
Young (born 1949-1955)
Declining
-.1 -.05 0 .05
Middle (born 1937-1948)
Declining
-.1 -.05 0 .05
Old (born 1925-1936)
Pre, individual controls Pre, all controls
Post, individual controls Post, all controls
Notes: Coefficients on the declining indicator along with their 95-percent confidence intervals
(robust to clustering by 1985 3-digit occupation) are displayed, where the regressions vary the
sample, controls, and outcome variables. Coefficients are scaled by the mean of the outcome
variable in each estimation sample. ‘Post’ refers to cumulative earnings 1986-2013. ‘Pre’ refers
to the sum of earnings 1975 & 1980 for the middle and old, and earnings in 1980 for the young.
We dropped the 1956-1960 birth cohorts as they did not reach age 25 by 1980, and for a similar
reason we did not use 1975 earnings data for the young. ‘Individual controls’ are those used in
column (2) of Table 4, and ‘all controls’ are the ones from column (6) in that table.
Figure OA2: Earnings prior to occupational decline
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(b) Cumulative earnings
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(c) Probability of remaining in the initial 3-digit occupation
Notes: Each bubble represents one of 1,052 5-digit Swedish occupations. Bubbles are scaled according to 1985 Swedish employ-
ment. The percent change in employment is assigned based on the changes 1984-2016 in the corresponding US occupations(s). De-
clining occupations are those that declined by more than 25 percent. Prior to aggregation, outcome variables were residualized based
on the regression models in columns (2) and (6) in Tables 4 and 5, but with ‘Declining’ times its coefficient added (the mean dif-
ference between declining and non-declining occupations in the plots is thus exactly equal to the coefficients reported in the tables).
The pairs of graphs on the right are truncated versions of those on the left.
Figure OA3: Main outcomes and percent change in employment (US)
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(b) Cumulative earnings
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(c) Probability of remaining in the initial 3-digit occupation
Notes: Each bubble represents one of 172 3-digit Swedish occupations. Bubbles are scaled according to 1985 Swedish employment.
‘Change in log employment’ refers to the actual change in log employment in each Swedish 3-digit occupation from 1985-2013. Oc-
cupations marked as declining are those in which more than two thirds of employment in 1985 was in a 5-digit occupation with the
‘Declining’ indicator equal to one. Prior to aggregation, outcome variables were residualized based on the corresponding regression
models reported on in the last panel of Table OA3, with log employment change times its coefficient added (lines fitted to the plots
would thus have slopes equal to the coefficients on log employment change reported in Table OA3). The pairs of graphs on the right
are truncated versions of those on the left.
Figure OA4: Main outcomes and change in log employment (Sweden)
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Notes: Diamonds mark the coefficients on the declining indicator from the regression specifi-
cations reported in columns (2) and (6) of Table OA12, except that income accumulates only
through time t. Capped bars indicate 95-percent confidence intervals.
Figure OA5: US (NLSY) occupational decline and individual-level earnings over time
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Table OA1: Employment growth in Swedish 3-digit occupations 1985-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Declining -0.76 -0.44 -0.46
(0.17) (0.18) (0.18)
Employment share 1985 -1.23 -2.40 -2.31
(1.61) (1.57) (1.53)
Employment growth 1960-85 0.34 0.16 0.15
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
Predicted growth index 0.31 0.22
(0.07) (0.08)
Prediction: no change -0.05 0.09
(0.44) (0.42)
Prediction: increase, slow 0.46 0.25
(0.36) (0.31)
Prediction: increase, average 0.74 0.55
(0.29) (0.25)
Prediction: increase, fast 1.13 0.82
(0.29) (0.28)
R2 0.12 0.15 0.21 0.22 0.29 0.29
Notes: The dependent variable is the difference in log employment in Swedish 3-digit occupations between 2013 and 1985. ‘Declining’ is a binary variable at the level of 1985 Swedish 5-digit occupations
indicating employment losses of more than 25 percent over the following three decades in the corresponding US occupation(s). The indicator has been collapsed to the 3-digit level and is thus a continuous
regressor. The decline indicator and predictions have been constructed using the Occupational Outlook Handbook (various years). Regressions are weighted by 1985 Swedish employment shares. The number
of observations is 172. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table OA2: Alternative cutoffs for occupational decline
Employment Earnings Earnings, normalized Remain
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Percent change ∈ [−100,−50) -0.34 -0.18 -248.1 -90.0 -2.44 -0.98 -0.18 -0.10
(0.20) (0.15) (115.6) (75.7) (0.62) (0.43) (0.040) (0.020)
Percent change ∈ [−100,−25) (baseline) -0.49 -0.19 -346.6 -126.4 -2.10 -1.11 -0.11 -0.045
(0.20) (0.14) (120.3) (58.3) (0.53) (0.36) (0.041) (0.020)
Percent change ∈ [−100,0) -0.043 -0.0030 -35.0 -57.5 -0.70 -0.91 -0.15 -0.063
(0.20) (0.13) (158.8) (74.7) (0.70) (0.47) (0.041) (0.021)
Percent change ∈ [−100,31) (below median) 0.14 0.15 -46.5 -61.9 -0.55 -0.53 -0.087 -0.0094
(0.18) (0.13) (150.7) (76.1) (0.57) (0.50) (0.037) (0.022)
Baseline; control: percent change ∈ (−25,31) -0.72 -0.27 -460.5 -126.6 -2.40 -1.17 -0.077 -0.053
(0.22) (0.16) (123.3) (61.9) (0.51) (0.40) (0.038) (0.018)
Individual controls X X X X X X X X
Occupation & industry controls X X X X
Observations 877,324 553,786
Notes: Results from regressions of various outcomes on indicators for occupational employment changes to lie in the indicated ranges are shown. Each panel represents a separate set of regressions. The underly-
ing variable is the percentage change in employment for the US occupation(s) corresponding to the Swedish 5-digit occupation that the individual worked in during 1985. The last panel only keeps observations
with a percentage change below the median, and the number of observations is thus halved. Normalized earnings are cumulative earnings divided by initial predicted earnings. See the notes to Tables 4 and 5 for
further descriptions of variables and sample definitions. Robust standard errors, clustered by 1985 3-digit occupation, in parentheses.
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Table OA3: Using continuous occupational employment changes as regressors
Employment Earnings Earnings, normalized Remain
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Percent employment change / 100 (US) -0.019 -0.026 103.7 64.7 0.47 0.25 0.0058 -0.0020
(0.037) (0.036) (30.2) (14.9) (0.11) (0.13) (0.0068) (0.0029)
Percent employment change / 100 (US), winsorized 0.010 0.000027 83.8 91.1 0.86 0.46 0.051 0.0035
(0.11) (0.080) (112.0) (47.5) (0.40) (0.25) (0.025) (0.014)
Log employment change (SWE) -0.034 0.049 306.4 73.7 0.85 0.087 0.11 0.066
(0.15) (0.11) (135.1) (65.9) (0.50) (0.50) (0.031) (0.017)
Individual controls X X X X X X X X
Occupation & industry controls X X X X
Observations 877,324 553,786
Notes: Results from regressions of various outcomes on change in occupational employment are shown. Each panel represents a separate set of regressions. ‘Percent employment change (US)’ refers to the
percentage change in employment 1984-2016 for the US occupation(s) corresponding to the Swedish 5-digit occupation that the individual worked in during 1985. The winsorized measure of this variable top-
codes changes at plus 217 percent (the 95th percentile). ‘Log employment change (SWE)’ refers to the change in log number employed 1985-2013 in the Swedish 3-digit occupation that the individual works
in during 1985. Normalized earnings are cumulative earnings divided by initial predicted earnings. See the notes to Tables 4 and 5 for further descriptions of variables and sample definitions. Robust standard
errors, clustered by 1985 3-digit occupation, in parentheses.
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Table OA4: Occupational decline and individual-level cumulative employment and earnings 1986-
2013—‘doughnut’ specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Cumulative years employed 1986-2013 (mean: 23.5)
Declining -1.46 -0.97 -0.97 -0.82 -0.35 -0.41
(0.53) (0.42) (0.42) (0.46) (0.28) (0.29)
B. Cumulative real earnings (’000 2014 SEK) 1986-2013 (mean: 6,612)
Declining -484 -403 -333 -140 -81 -217
(608) (196) (177) (181) (158) (167)
C. Cumulative real earnings divided by predicted initial earnings (mean: 39.2)
Declining -5.40 -2.49 -2.56 -1.81 -1.18 -1.69
(1.33) (1.09) (0.98) (1.07) (0.82) (1.05)
Demographics & earnings X X X X X
Life-cycle profiles X X X X
Predictors of growth X X X
Occupation dummies X X
Industry dummies X
Notes: Results from regressions of the indicated outcomes on a dummy for working in 1985 in a subsequently declining occupation are
shown. The sample is the same as in Table 4, but excludes 3-digit occupations in which some but not all 5-digit occupations are coded as
declining. Thus, within each 3-digit occupation, either all 5-digit sub-occupations decline, or none, leaving out intermediate cases (‘dough-
nut’). The number of observations is 488,484. Robust standard errors, clustered by 1985 3-digit occupation, in parentheses.
Table OA5: Occupational decline and individual occupational stability—‘doughnut’ specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Probability of working in same 3-digit occupation in 2013 as in 1985 (mean: 0.35)
Declining -0.25 -0.21 -0.21 -0.12 -0.17 -0.10
(0.046) (0.051) (0.052) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046)
B. Probability of working in same 2-digit occupation in 2013 as in 1985 (mean: 0.40)
Declining -0.21 -0.16 -0.16 -0.089 -0.12 -0.059
(0.039) (0.045) (0.046) (0.043) (0.045) (0.042)
C. Probability of working in same 1-digit occupation in 2013 as in 1985 (mean: 0.44)
Declining -0.19 -0.14 -0.14 -0.077 -0.11 -0.045
(0.036) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.033)
Demographics & earnings X X X X X
Life-cycle profiles X X X X
Predictors of growth X X X
Occupation dummies X X
Industry dummies X
Notes: Results from regressions of the indicated outcomes on a dummy for working in 1985 in a subsequently declining occupation are
shown. The sample is the same as in Table 5, but with the ‘doughnut’ restrictions from Table OA4 applied. The number of observations is
333,357. Robust standard errors, clustered by 1985 3-digit occupation, in parentheses.
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Table OA6: Alternative functional forms for earnings
A. Discounted cumulative earnings
Discounted cumulative earnings Discounted cumulative earnings, normalized
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Declining -152.7 -47.8 -49.5 -33.2 -0.94 -0.47 -0.51 -0.40
(57.1) (25.5) (24.4) (29.5) (0.25) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18)
Declining × rank 213.9 1.22
(68.5) (0.25)
Declining × bottom tercile -166.5 -0.96
(47.6) (0.23)
Declining × top tercile 109.3 0.64
(62.0) (0.21)
Individual controls X X X X X X X X
Occupation & industry controls X X X X X X
Mean of dep. var. 3,476 19.4
Mean of dep. var., bottom 2,954 17.5
B. Rank, logs, and growth
Percentile rank in cumulative earnings Logarithm of cumulative earnings Percent growth in earnings 1985-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Declining -1.48 -0.85 -0.85 -0.95 -0.060 -0.021 -0.026 -0.00054 -41.8 -11.7 -9.39 0.73
(0.84) (0.54) (0.50) (0.63) (0.022) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (11.2) (8.61) (8.80) (7.99)
Declining × rank 5.15 0.17 145.6
(0.93) (0.035) (35.7)
Declining × bottom tercile -3.26 -0.15 -110.0
(0.78) (0.037) (32.7)
Declining × top tercile 3.41 0.072 69.9
(0.89) (0.018) (24.9)
Individual controls X X X X X X X X X X X X
Occupation & industry controls X X X X X X X X X
Mean of dep. var. 50.5 8.6 178
Mean of dep. var., bottom 43.0 8.4 328
Notes: Results from regressions of the indicated earnings measures on the declining indicator, within-occupation earnings rank or tercile dummies (coefficients omitted from table), and their interactions are
shown. All regressions control for the level of 1985 earnings, with the exception of rank and logarithm as the outcome variables, in which case 1985 earnings rank and log of 1985 earnings are controlled for, re-
spectively. Discounted cumulative earnings are calculated using an interest rate of 5 percent. Normalized earnings are cumulative earnings divided by initial predicted earnings. See the notes to Tables 4 and 5 for
further descriptions of variables and sample definitions. The number of observations is 877,324, except when the log of cumulative earnings is the outcome variable, in which case the number is 875,830. Robust
standard errors, clustered by 1985 3-digit occupation, in parentheses.
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Table OA7: Heterogeneity by within-occupation residualized earnings rank
Employment Earnings Earnings, normalized Remain
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Linear interaction
Declining -0.59 -0.20 -332.3 -154.0 -2.32 -1.22 -0.11 -0.042
(0.22) (0.14) (90.2) (59.3) (0.56) (0.37) (0.041) (0.020)
Declining × rank 0.92 0.96 407.7 439.5 2.33 2.41 -0.020 -0.014
(0.33) (0.29) (141.9) (137.3) (0.59) (0.56) (0.016) (0.015)
B. Dummy interactions
Declining -0.26 0.048 -302.5 -94.5 -1.94 -0.92 -0.095 -0.032
(0.22) (0.16) (96.4) (62.9) (0.52) (0.38) (0.050) (0.025)
Declining × bottom tercile -1.16 -1.11 -370.4 -390.7 -2.14 -2.10 -0.015 -0.0082
(0.36) (0.33) (93.5) (86.2) (0.48) (0.44) (0.019) (0.017)
Declining × top tercile 0.16 0.24 220.2 202.7 0.99 1.12 -0.037 -0.026
(0.15) (0.15) (109.2) (111.3) (0.47) (0.45) (0.027) (0.020)
Individual controls X X X X X X X X
Occupation & industry controls X X X X
Mean of dep. var. 23.4 6,926 38.7 0.29
Mean of dep. var., bottom 22.0 6,139 34.3 0.26
Observations 877,324 553,786
Notes: The notes to Table 6 apply, with the only difference that rank and terciles refer to the within-occupation distribution of 1985 earnings residualized by gender, cohort, and county. Robust standard errors,
clustered by 1985 3-digit occupation, in parentheses..
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Table OA8: Cumulative earnings of leavers and stayers in declining and non-declining occupations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. All workers (553,169 observations)
Remain 335 303 305 284
(122) (91) (133) (101)
Declining -272 -127
(122) (90)
Declining × remain 177 190
(239) (185)
B. Employed in 2013 (404,043 observations)
Remain -398 -498 -439 -531
(115) (66) (124) (72)
Declining -357 -188
(123) (94)
Declining × remain 238 312
(231) (158)
C. Employed in 2013, bottom third (140,892 observations)
Remain -109 -285 -133 -307
(139) (85) (143) (80)
Declining -418 -238
(145) (173)
Declining × remain -32 235
(596) (425)
Individual controls X X X X
Occupation & industry controls X X
Notes: The dependent variable is cumulative earnings 1986-2013 in thousands of 2014 SEK. ‘Remain’ is an indicator for working in the
same 3-digit occupation in 2013 as in 1985. Individual-level controls include female, cohort, county, and education dummies, as well as
earnings in 1985. Occupation and industry controls include predicted life-time income, predictors of occupational growth, occupation
dummies, and industry dummies. The sample is the same as that in Table 5, except for the restrictions indicated. Sampling weights are
applied. Robust standard errors, clustered by 1985 3-digit occupation, in parentheses.
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Table OA9: Baseline characteristics of workers in subsequently declining occupations—technology-related declines
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female Age Compulsory school High school College Earnings Manufacturing
A. Occupational decline, pooled
Intercept 0.52 39.5 0.33 0.56 0.11 191.3 0.25
(0.078) (0.41) (0.030) (0.033) (0.027) (10.8) (0.050)
Declining -0.25 -0.89 0.13 -0.063 -0.070 -0.23 0.38
(0.088) (0.63) (0.035) (0.034) (0.028) (11.0) (0.085)
B. Occupational decline, by presence of technology link
Intercept 0.52 39.5 0.33 0.56 0.11 191.3 0.25
(0.078) (0.41) (0.030) (0.033) (0.027) (10.8) (0.050)
Declining -0.32 0.033 0.13 -0.086 -0.041 5.31 0.26
(0.10) (0.87) (0.056) (0.051) (0.035) (15.0) (0.10)
Declining (technology) 0.11 -1.49 0.010 0.037 -0.047 -8.90 0.20
(0.097) (1.01) (0.059) (0.050) (0.025) (14.6) (0.12)
Notes: Results from OLS regressions of various baseline (1985) characteristics on a constant and indicators for working in a declining occupation are shown (see the notes to Table OA11 for a description of
these indicators). Earnings are measured in thousand Swedish crowns inflated to 2014 levels. The sample is the same as in panel A of Table 2. The number of observations is 3,061,051. Robust standard errors,
clustered by 1985 3-digit occupation, in parentheses.
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Table OA10: Occupational decline and individual-level cumulative employment and earnings 1986-
2013—technology-related decline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Change in log employment 1985-2013 in 3-digit occupation
Declining -0.43 -0.25
(0.16) (0.09)
Declining (technology) 0.06 0.05 -0.38 -0.21
(0.17) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14)
B. Cumulative years employed 1986-2013 (mean: 23.4)
Declining -0.93 -0.45
(0.44) (0.24)
Declining (technology) 0.72 0.42 -0.21 0.01 -0.16
(0.45) (0.23) (0.16) (0.14) (0.12)
Declining (tech) × rank 1.31
(0.36)
C. Cumulative real earnings (’000 2014 SEK) 1986-2013 (mean: 6,926)
Declining -426 -181
(232) (93)
Declining (technology) 128 87 -303 -107 -122
(262) (102) (131) (65) (61)
Declining (tech) × rank 491
(155)
D. Probability of working in same 3-digit occupation in 2013 as in 1985 (mean: 0.29)
Declining -0.077 -0.029
(0.051) (0.022)
Declining (technology) -0.058 -0.025 -0.135 -0.053 -0.056
(0.044) (0.029) (0.043) (0.026) (0.026)
Declining (tech) × rank 0.019
(0.016)
Individual controls X X X X X
Occupation & industry controls X X X
Observations (population—sample) 877,324—553,786 836,057—532,421
Notes: Results from regressions of the indicated outcomes on indicators for working in 1985 in a subsequently declining occupation are
shown (see the notes to Table OA11 for a description of these indicators). Columns (1)-(2) are based on the same samples as the results in
Tables 4 and 5. Columns (3)-(5) exclude workers in occupations that are classified as declining without a technology link. Individual-level
controls include female, cohort, county, and education dummies, as well as earnings in 1985. Occupation and industry controls include
predicted life-time income, predictors of occupational growth, occupation dummies, and industry dummies. Sampling weights are used in
the regression reported in panel C. Robust standard errors, clustered by 1985 3-digit occupation, in parentheses.
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Table OA11: Employment growth in Swedish 3-digit occupations 1985-2013—technology-related declines
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Declining -0.76 -0.44 -0.92 -0.37
(0.17) (0.18) (0.27) (0.27)
Declining (technology) 0.27 -0.11 -0.69 -0.49
(0.33) (0.35) (0.20) (0.25)
Employment share 1985 -2.40 -2.41 -2.28
(1.57) (1.57) (1.61)
Employment growth 1960-85 0.16 0.16 0.16
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Predicted growth index 0.22 0.23 0.22
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
R2 0.12 0.29 0.12 0.29 0.06 0.22
Observations 172 172 172 172 148 148
Notes: The dependent variable is the difference in log employment in Swedish 3-digit occupations between 2013 and 1985. ‘Declining’ is a binary variable at the level of 1985 Swedish 5-digit occupations
indicating employment losses of more than 25 percent over the following three decades in the corresponding US occupation(s). ‘Declining (technology)’ indicates that this decline is related to technological
replacement. Both indicators have been collapsed to the 3-digit level and are thus continuous regressors. Columns (10) and (11) exclude 3-digit occupations where ‘Declining’ is larger than or equal to 0.5 and
‘Declining (technology)’ is smaller than 0.5. Decline indicators and predictions have been constructed using the Occupational Outlook Handbook (various years). Regressions are weighted by 1985 Swedish
employment shares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table OA12: US (NLSY) occupational decline and individual-level earnings 1988-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Average real earnings (2014 USD) 1988-2013, no interpolation (mean: 44,083)
Declining -2,661 -151 279 595 655 -24
(3,372) (1,589) (1,635) (1,750) (1,584) (1,536)
B. Average real earnings (2014 USD) 1989-2013, no interpolation, odd years only (mean: 46,057)
Declining -2,600 123 607 954 1,124 384
(3,649) (1,901) (1,967) (2,107) (1,891) (1,823)
C. Average real earnings (2014 USD) 1988-2013 (mean: 46,891)
Declining -2,970 -92 408 892 963 227
(3,783) (2,029) (2,100) (2,255) (2,012) (1,969)
D. Cumulative real earnings (2014 USD) 1988-2013 (mean: 1,216,117)
Declining -95,964 -17,313 -5,801 12,310 23,322 2,783
(102,583) (55,596) (56,336) (59,240) (54,961) (56,695)
E. Cumulative real earnings divided by predicted initial earnings (mean: 44.2)
Declining -4.04 -2.71 -3.69 -4.87 -2.10 -2.43
(2.57) (2.44) (2.10) (3.45) (2.80) (2.52)
Demographics & earnings X X X X X
Life-cycle profiles X X X X
Predictors of growth X X X
Occupation dummies X X
Industry dummies X
Notes: Results from regressions of the indicated outcomes on a dummy for working in 1987 in a subsequently declining occupation are shown. Detailed descriptions of all variables and their construction are in
the appendix; here, we summarize the main characteristics. Demographic controls include female, region, education and birth year dummies, and ‘earnings’ refers to the level of labor income in 1987. Occupation-
level life-cycle profiles are cumulative earnings calculated for each individual based on their 1987 occupation. Predictor of growth is the 1986 OOH outlook for each individual based on their 1987 occupa-
tion. Occupation and industry dummies are at the broad group and group category levels, respectively. The sample includes all individuals with an occupation listed 1987 and at least 8 years of reported labor
earnings. Sampling weights are applied. The number of observations is 6,679 in panels A-C and 5,817 in panels D and E. Robust standard errors, clustered by 1987 occupation, in parentheses.
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Table OA13: US (NLSY) occupational decline and individual employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Fraction of reported weeks in employment status (mean: 0.83)
Declining 0.014 0.017 0.018 0.014 0.0035 0.0042
(0.012) (0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0089) (0.0094)
B. Fraction of reported weeks in unemployment status (mean: 0.03)
Declining 0.0063 0.0043 0.0041 0.0052 0.0051 0.0042
(0.0038) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0030)
Demographics & earnings X X X X X
Life-cycle profiles X X X X
Predictors of growth X X X
Occupation dummies X X
Industry dummies X
Notes: Results from regressions of the indicated outcomes on a dummy for working in 1987 in a subsequently declining occupation are shown. Detailed descriptions of all variables and their construction are in
the appendix; here, we summarize the main characteristics. Demographic controls include female, region, education and birth year dummies, and ‘earnings’ refers to the level of labor income in 1987. Occupation-
level life-cycle profiles are cumulative earnings calculated for each individual based on their 1987 occupation. Predictor of growth is the 1986 OOH outlook for each individual based on their 1987 occupa-
tion. Occupation and industry dummies are at the broad group and group category levels, respectively. The sample includes all individuals with an occupation listed 1987 and at least 418 weeks (8 years) of
reported labor force status. Sampling weights are applied. The number of observations is 6,722. Robust standard errors, clustered by 1987 occupation, in parentheses.
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Table OA14: US (NLSY) occupational decline and individual occupational stability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Probability of working in same occupation in 2014 as in 1987 (mean: 0.09)
Declining -0.043 -0.039 -0.038 -0.032 -0.022 -0.012
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019)
B. Probability of working in same occupation group in 2014 as in 1987 (mean: 0.20)
Declining -0.0050 0.00079 0.0025 -0.0087 0.016 0.022
(0.032) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.026)
C. Probability of working in same broad occupation group in 2014 as in 1987 (mean: 0.36)
Declining -0.066 -0.048 -0.041 -0.044 0.033 0.041
(0.052) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.027) (0.026)
Demographics & earnings X X X X X
Life-cycle profiles X X X X
Predictors of growth X X X
Occupation dummies X X
Industry dummies X
Notes: Results from regressions of the indicated outcomes on a dummy for working in 1987 in a subsequently declining occupation are shown. Detailed descriptions of all variables and their construction are in
the appendix; here, we summarize the main characteristics. Demographic controls include female, region, education and birth year dummies, and ‘earnings’ refers to the level of labor income in 1987. Occupation-
level life-cycle profiles are cumulative earnings calculated for each individual based on their 1987 occupation. Predictor of growth is the 1986 OOH outlook for each individual based on their 1987 occupa-
tion. Occupation and industry dummies are at the broad group and group category levels, respectively. The sample includes all individuals with an occupation listed 1987 who were interviewed in 2014. Sampling
weights are applied. The number of observations is 5,749. Robust standard errors, clustered by 1987 occupation, in parentheses.
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